The Desert Blues

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The Desert Blues

In 2001, two unlikely friends created a music festival in Mali that drew the likes of Bono and Robert Plant. Then radical Islam tore them apart.

By Joshua Hammer

The Atavist Magazine, No. 48


Joshua Hammer is a former Newsweek bureau chief and correspondent at large in Africa and the Middle East. He is a contributing editor to Smithsonian and Outside, and his writing also appears in The New York Review of BooksThe New Yorker, the AtlanticThe New York Times MagazineNational Geographic, and many other publications. His fourth book, The Badass Librarians of Timbuktu: And Their Race to Save the World’s Most Precious Manuscripts, will be published by Simon & Schuster in early 2016.

This project was supported by a grant from the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting.


Editors: Katia Bachko and Joel Lovell
Producer: Megan Detrie
Designer: Gray Beltran
Copy Editor: Sean Cooper
Fact Checker: Kyla Jones
Images: Alice Mutasa, Nadia Nid El-Mourad (including cover photo), Jonathan Brandstein, Corbis, Associated Press
Video: Joe Conte/Ola TV
Music: Samba Touré, “Fondora”; Noura Mint Seymali, “Tikifite”; Super Onze, “Adar Neeba”; Lo’Jo, “De Timbuktu à Essakane”; Terakaft, “Alghalem”; Khaira Arby, “La Liberte”



Published in May 2015. Design updated in 2021.

Author’s Note — November 20, 2015

The terrorist attack at the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako, the capital of Mali, wasn’t supposed to happen. Just a little more than two years ago French forces crushed a ragtag army of a thousand jihadis who had seized control of most of the African country. Opération Serval initially seemed a smashing success: French soldiers killed hundreds of extremists, dispersed the rest deep into the desert, and restored a sense of fragile normality to a region where, for one grim year, music was banned and adulterers were stoned to death.

Since early this year, however, Mali’s home-grown insurgency—which some say inspired the Islamic State—has come back to life. Militants have chased African peacekeepers out of the desert and carried out a series of murderous attacks across the country. On Friday—precisely one week after IS terrorists murdered 129 people on the streets of Paris—Mali’s jihadists carried out their most daring operation yet, storming the gates of the luxury hotel, seizing dozens of hostages and murdering at least 27 people, as of this writing. The hotel was a regular destination for Air France flight crews on the Paris-Bamako route, and some theorized that the act had been carried out in solidarity with IS. Whatever the case, France now appears to be waging war on at least two fronts. And Mali, its former colony, is spiraling again into instability and violence.

I have reported in Mali for more than 20 years, drawn to its vibrant music scene. In 2014, I traveled to the region to understand how the country’s musicians became a target of the Islamist rebels. What I discovered was the story of a friendship between two men who have lived the conflict in the most intimate way imaginable.

—Joshua Hammer

One

When Mohamed Aly Ansar studied international law at the University of Bamako, in the capital of Mali, he spent his days thinking about how to bring development to his impoverished nation. But at night he had a much different dream, one that came to him over and over: He saw himself standing in the middle of the desert near a stage, watching as a helicopter descended. The chopper was carrying the Swedish pop group ABBA, and Ansar was there to receive them.

Thirty years later, on January 12, 2012, a version of that dream came true. Ansar stood on the tarmac at the airport just outside Timbuktu, searching the dark sky for the lights of a private jet. Ansar was the founder of a three-day concert series called the Festival in the Desert, sometimes referred to as the African Woodstock, and on this cool night, he was waiting for Bono to arrive.

Around 8 p.m., the plane carrying the U2 front man alighted on the small runway, and Ansar climbed aboard to greet his guest. He found Bono relaxing on a sofa with his wife and a few friends. The group was excited about the festival, and Bono, dressed as always in black, asked Ansar, whom everyone called Manny, whether he thought Timbuktu was safe.

The situation was fine, Ansar replied. And everything was fine, but he knew more than he was saying, and he didn’t want to scare his guests.

For years, Mali had been among the most stable countries in western Africa, a democratic, laid-back, tourist-friendly oasis. It also had one of the world’s most vibrant music scenes. The Festival in the Desert had flourished since its inception in 2001, and some of the most famous musicians in the world—Robert Plant, Damon Albarn, and other Western stars—had come to play with popular Malian musicians. But things had grown darker in recent months. The Tuareg, a group of nomadic Berbers who periodically rose up against the government in the remote northeast corner of the country, were restive again. Radical Islam, introduced to North Africa in the 1990s, was rapidly gaining converts. And the Arab Spring, which began as a moment of hope in late 2010, had created ethnic and religious chaos that threatened to destabilize the entire region.

Even as Ansar reassured Bono—and it was true that at that moment the city of Timbuktu was enjoying a period of temporary calm—a large group of jihadist fighters were encamped in the desert. Armed with weapons stolen from the armories of the recently murdered Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddhafi, the jihadists had announced their plans to attack the government’s weak army. Six weeks earlier, three Europeans had been kidnapped and a fourth killed at a hotel in Timbuktu. Ansar didn’t mention his fear that his famous guest might be abducted.

Bono and his entourage boarded a guarded convoy of four-wheel-drive vehicles and drove to the festival grounds outside Timbuktu—a wide, sandy tract bordered by white domed tents. Troops patrolled the dunes outside the festival grounds, scanning the horizon for suspicious movement. As the crowd of 7,000 braced against the cold night air, Ansar escorted Bono to a VIP box. After an hour, Bono retired to a French-owned luxury guesthouse, where he was guarded by a dozen troops. The next day, he took a hike alone past the military perimeter and into the dunes while Ansar waited anxiously in a tent on the festival grounds.

That evening, Tinariwen (pronounced tee-na-ree-wayn), the festival’s headliner, took the stage. The band was composed of former Tuareg rebels who had achieved international fame with their haunting music, known as the desert blues. The group had formed in exile in Libya during the 1980s, and their music was deeply rooted in the Tuareg’s turbulent history: Like protest singers in the United States during the Vietnam War era, the musicians gave voice to an angry, alienated generation. They sang not about peace but about war, a fight for the dream of an independent Tuareg nation, which they called Azawad—“land of pasture.”

The crowd exploded when Bono got up to join the band, dancing and improvising with the singers and guitarists. A few hours later, he boarded his jet and flew to Bamako, in the south, far from the jihadists’ stronghold.

A year later, I sat with Ansar in the garden of a riverside guesthouse in Bamako. He described the palpable relief he felt once his celebrity charge had departed. The festival had been an artistic success, he said, and had even made some money, but there was no time to celebrate. In the weeks before the event, newspapers had predicted that the Islamist rebels would attack and Western embassies had warned that northern Mali was highly dangerous. Ansar knew too well that those fears were well founded. After all, Iyad Ag Ghali, the man who commanded the fighters, had been one of Ansar’s closest friends—and had even inspired the festival that he and his rebels now saw as an affront to their vision for an Islamic state in Mali.

The story of their friendship, sealed by music before it was severed by ideology, is in many ways the story of Mali itself, and of the fractures between radical and moderate Islam that have emerged across the globe. But for Manny Ansar and Iyad Ag Ghali, their estrangement revealed more fundamental questions—about belief and betrayal, and about how well we really know those closest to us.

On January 14, roadies dismantled the stage and fans began the long journey home from Timbuktu. Meanwhile, somewhere in the desert, Ansar’s old friend was rallying hundreds of jihadist fighters. Once everyone departed, Ansar wondered if he had just closed his last festival and whether Ghali would deliver on his threat to destroy everything they had built together.

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Audience members at the Festival in the Desert. Photo: Alice Mutasa

Two

Manny Ansar and Iyad Ag Ghali met for the first time in January 1991, at the villa of a prominent Tuareg politician in Bamako named Baye Ag Mohamed. Four months earlier, Ghali and 45 rebels armed only with knives and hand grenades had ambushed a small army camp in northeast Mali. In close combat, rebels killed nearly 100 people and captured armored vehicles, mortars, and rocket launchers. The attack, the most brutal in a series of them, forced the army to retreat, and Mali’s military dictator Moussa Traoré began negotiations with the rebels.

Government officials and rebel commanders met in Tamanrasset, a large town in the southern Algerian desert. The enemies reached a ceasefire agreement, and the regime brought a delegation of five rebel commanders to Bamako for a round of ceremonial events. Mohamed invited Ghali to stay with him and arranged a meeting with Ansar. 

The roots of the hatred between the Tuareg and the Malian government date to the end of the 19th century, when the French colonial army forcibly occupied the Tuareg’s traditional homeland in the central Sahara. French administrators joined the arid north with the Niger River valley and the southern savanna, both dominated by black Africans, creating an awkward colonial construct they called French Sudan, later known as Mali. It would never be an easy peace, in part because the light-skinned Tuareg traditionally believed that blacks were inferior and kept many as slaves. (Descendants of those black slaves, known as bellah, speak Tamasheq, the language of the Tuareg, but tend not to identify as Tuareg because of the racial divide.) In the 1950s, the colonial administration considered joining the north with the Saharan regions of other French colonies to create a separate Tuareg state, but the idea was abandoned because the territory wasn’t viable without access to the Niger, Mali’s lifeblood.

In 1991, Ansar was working as an administrator for a Norwegian development organization in Bamako. He was also the leader of an association of young Tuareg students and professionals from the Timbuktu region that raised money from European donors to build wells and primary schools in the northern desert.

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In college, Manny Ansar made recordings of traditional Malian musicians. In 2001, he founded the Festival in the Desert to celebrate their music. Photo: Jonathan Brandstein

Ansar and his fellow urban Tuareg didn’t support the rebellion, but they were in awe of the insurgents’ military prowess. “Everyone wanted to see these people who, when they started to fight, put Moussa Traoré in the position of begging,” he recalled. “They were like Rambo. There was something mystical about them.” Some worried that he was committing treason, but Mohamed assured Ansar that the rebels wanted to make peace. 

Ushered into Mohamed’s salon, Ansar laid eyes on the guerrillas for the first time. The men’s hair was long and tousled, their faces sunburned. Though they had done their best to attire themselves properly, with vests, trousers, and button-down shirts, it was clear that they had just emerged from the desert. Tall, slender, and bare headed, with expressive eyes, a wild black mane, and a walrus mustache, Ghali stood out. Ansar regarded him with a mix of admiration and trepidation.

Ansar invited Ghali and his four fellow commanders to a reception at a popular Bamako restaurant. He didn’t know what to expect, but he decided to break the ice with music and had crafted a mix tape of songs by some of Mali’s biggest stars, including Ali Farka Touré, a masterful guitarist and vocalist from the north, and Salif Keita, an albino troubadour from southern Mali. Four of the Tuareg commanders chatted up the female guests and danced, but Ghali sat silent in his chair. “He was closed off, shy, naturally fearful,” Ansar remembered, speculating that he had had little interaction with women before this, or that he had suffered some trauma that made him suspicious and guarded around strangers.  

When the meal was over, Ansar and Ghali retreated to a private room. Ansar told Ghali that because his father was a decorated Tuareg officer in the Malian army, he grew up on military bases and saluted the flag every morning. 

“What made you want to raise arms against the state?” Ansar asked.

Urged on by Ansar’s extroverted nature, Ghali began to talk. For the next several hours, he recounted his tumultuous youth, which followed the contours of Mali’s difficult path. Ghali grew up near Kidal, a dusty administrative outpost of 2,000 people living in wattle-and-daub huts in the shadow of a French colonial fort. 

When Mali achieved independence in 1960, long-smoldering ethnic animosities reemerged. Tuareg, who comprise about 3 percent of Mali’s population of 16.5 million, felt oppressed and ignored by the central government. In 1963, when Ghali was a small boy, Tuareg rebels swept across the desert on camels, seized rifles from government depots, and ambushed government soldiers. The government forces could not defeat the rebels and began to target civilians and their livestock. Thousands of innocents died. Ghali’s father, who served as a guide to the government army, was killed by a Tuareg rebel. And yet, after witnessing the killings of so many of his fellow Tuareg, Ghali, like many of his generation, came to believe that his people’s survival depended on forming their own state. During a devastating drought in the 1970s, government troops stole food donated by international aid agencies and sold it in markets. Many young Tuareg fled into exile, and Ghali left Kidal. “We didn’t believe we had a future here,” he told Ansar.  

He traveled by camel and on foot to Libya and settled in a shantytown outside Tripoli while he looked for work. A photograph of Ghali taken around this time shows a teenager with an Afro and flared jeans poking out beneath an embroidered Arab gown. In Tripoli, in the 1970s, Ghali began to frequent cafés in Tuareg neighborhoods, where a vibrant music scene was preserving the Tuareg culture. Many of the exiles’ songs recalled the rebellion of 1963 and the dream of a separate Tuareg nation. The singers modernized the traditional music of northern Mali, replacing the four-string lute, or teherdent, with acoustic and electric guitars. A typical song declared: 

You should be in the desert 

Where the blood of kin has been spilled

That desert is our country 

And in it is our future.

When Ghali spoke of Tuareg music, Ansar felt the distance between them shrink. As a boy, Ansar had been drawn to Tuareg warriors and their doomed struggle. He had grown up in a desert encampment 75 miles north of Timbuktu, a region of rolling dunes and a few scattered Artesian wells. When he was five years old, a tall bronze man, wearing a purple turban decorated with silver jewelry, arrived at his home. The man wore a traditional white gown, or boubou, from which dangled goatskin bags covered with red and green embroidery, and he carried a teherdent made of wood and leather. He was a griot, an itinerant singer and oral historian who traveled from village to village, telling stories about Tuareg culture and history. The adults laid carpets in the dunes and gathered the family around a bonfire; people from neighboring encampments came to watch the griot’s performance. The griot sang about Ansar’s great-great-grandfather Ngouna, who was the chief of the Kel Antassar clan when the first French soldiers arrived in the Sahara. In the late 1890s, Ngouna led the Tuareg resistance against the French military occupiers; he died in an ambush in the very dunes where the griot performed. 

While he was at university, Ansar had often traveled back to his ancestral home with a reel-to-reel tape recorder, capturing the performances of traditional musicians. He made cassettes of the music and played them for his fellow students back in Bamako. 

While Ansar graduated from college and started working in rural development, Ghali became a mercenary. In 1981, Gaddhafi began recruiting a force to expand Libya’s influence in Africa and the Middle East, and Ghali joined the fight. He spent the next decade in and out of Gaddhafi’s camps, training in Syria and fighting in Lebanon alongside Yasser Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organization, and later in Chad, where Gaddhafi was trying to unseat the country’s president. 

Whenever Ghali returned to Libya, he lived in a Tuareg military camp near Tripoli. There he met Ibrahim Ag Alhabib, a skinny, brooding man with a billowing Afro. Alhabib’s father had been executed for helping the rebels in 1963. After the government destroyed the family’s livestock, he fled to the Algerian city of Oran, on the Mediterranean. In exile, Alhabib fashioned a guitar out of an oilcan and a bicycle cable. He was a musical omnivore, drawing on everything from the protest music of the Maghreb and Egyptian pop to the desert blues of Ali Farka Touré to Bob Marley, Elvis Presley, and Carlos Santana. The music he composed was often nothing more than a couple of chords and a repetitive phrase. It was austere and haunting, with Alhabib’s unpolished voice imparting a ragged authenticity. 

“They murdered the old folk and a child just born,” Alhabib sang in “Sixty-Three,” one of his early songs:

They swooped down to the pastures and wiped out the cattle

’63 has gone, but will return. 

Before long, Ghali began writing romantic ballads and martial songs for Alhabib and his band, including an anthem that would become the national hymn of Azawad:

Like true warriors we are going to trample on the enemy

Yes, in the name of God, we rise up and begin. 

By 1990, the Tuareg rebels in exile had become disillusioned with Gaddhafi, who promised to provide them with arms and vehicles but never delivered. Ghali left Libya with about 100 rebels and returned to Mali. “We are not bandits, but we want to claim our rights as Malian citizens,” they declared in a communiqué. “Today, these rights are trampled upon by the Malian government, which considers us strangers.”

Ghali’s army soon grew to more than 1,000 men. Their years of fighting for Gaddhafi had created a fierce force skilled in close combat. They seized vehicles from an international relief agency in northern Mali and captured weapons from poorly trained Malian soldiers in the north, who were quick to abandon their bases. 

In the evenings, the rebels gathered to hear Alhabib, and other Tuareg musicians who had joined the fight, play music around a fire. Bootleg cassettes of these sessions circulated throughout the north, attracting more young Tuareg to the insurgency. As Alhabib sang: 

Let the blood boil if it is really in your veins

At the break of day, take your arms and take the hilltops

We kill our enemies and become like eagles

We’ll liberate all those who live in the plains.

For months, Ghali’s men hammered the Malian forces, until the government finally conceded in September 1990 and negotiated the ceasefire. In Bamako, Ghali was stunned by what he found—educated Tuareg like Ansar, with decent jobs, and plenty of black Malians who didn’t want to exterminate the Tuareg. “Before I came here I thought Mali was an evil place,” he told Ansar. “I’ve seen a different reality.” 

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Tuareg rebels in the Malian Sahara, November 1990. Photo: Getty Images

Three

Ghali worked to maintain the ceasefire, but the accord began to unravel. Moussa Traoré’s dictatorship collapsed in the face of nationwide protests in March 1991. The interim leader, a former military man named Amadou Toumani Touré, pledged a quick democratic transition and committed himself to a lasting peace in the north. But many fighters in Ghali’s ranks believed that the instability afforded them an opportunity to wrest more concessions from the new government and urged him to resume their fight. European and American diplomats, as well as representatives from Mali’s powerful neighbor Algeria, warned Ghali that the Tuareg faced international isolation if they picked up their guns again.

Caught between powerful forces, Ghali organized a conference in June 1991 and called upon his new acquaintance Ansar to help him urge their fellow Tuareg to keep the peace. Ghali was waiting at the airport in Tamanrasset when Ansar arrived. The rebel chief brought Ansar to his modest house, introduced him to his wife and daughter, and took him out for a meal. “I’m going to lose the peace, Manny,” he said. Ansar reached out to influential young Tuareg from the north, and soon after, Touré organized a special flight to carry 30 Tuareg tribal chiefs and politicians to Tamanrasset. 

For the next ten days, Ansar met Tuareg leaders from across the country in the grand salon of the Tamanrasset governor’s mansion, urging them to stand behind the accord and persuade the fighters to lay down their arms. In the evenings, he and Ghali walked in the lively streets of Tamanrasset, stopping at small cafés to hear live music. 

One afternoon, Ghali drove Ansar to a dry riverbed in the shadow of the Hoggar Mountains, which rise to more than 9,000 feet. A dozen all-terrain vehicles were parked at a camp, and mutton sizzled on a grill. Ansar sat beside Ghali on a carpet in the white sand, and together they watched low clouds on the horizon glow orange, then purple. Alhabib, Ghali’s friend from the camps in Libya, and Abdallah Ag Alhousseyni, a former rebel-musician from a family of Islamic scholars deep in the Malian desert, set up a rudimentary sound system and played the songs they’d written in exile. As their guitars and raw voices echoed across the riverbed, Ansar drifted back 25 years to songs he had heard as a child.

My God, this is Ali Farka Touré singing in Tamasheq, the language of the Tuareg, Ansar thought. Ghali, too, seemed transported. “All the stress, the rebellion, the attacks were left behind,” Ansar recalled. One of the songs that the group sang was “Toumast,” or “The People,” a call for rebel unity:

A divided people will never reach its goal

It will never cultivate an acacia tree with beautiful leaves

A divided people will lose its way

Each part of it will become an enemy in itself.

Despite Ghali’s efforts the ceasefire collapsed, and Tuareg radicals resumed attacking army posts and camps. In 1992, after the deaths of hundreds more fighters and civilians, Ghali finally persuaded factional leaders to sign a new accord. Funds were set up to support former rebels and compensate victims. Government troops agreed to withdraw from many posts in the north, and hundreds of former rebels joined the Malian armed forces. 

After the new pact was signed, fighters began collecting their weapons. In March 1996, the country’s newly elected president joined Ghali at a ceremonial burning of 3,000 Kalashnikovs in Timbuktu. The weapons were encased in the Flame of Peace monument to commemorate the occasion. Nearby murals painted by local artists depicted Malian soldiers clasping the hands of Tuareg insurgents. For the first time since 1990, Mali was at peace.

The government hailed Ghali as a statesman and a peacemaker and considered various political and military positions for him but ultimately decided that the Lion of the Desert, as many called him, would never be satisfied in a conventional post. “Because he was the biggest fighter, no one was in a position to be the chief of Iyad,” Ansar explained. In the end, Ghali became an unofficial security adviser to the president and a diplomat without portfolio. He worked out of his villa in Bamako and also at the so-called Commissary of the North, located next to the president’s palace, a whitewashed Moorish-style villa perched atop an extinct volcano. He traveled with the president on diplomatic missions to Mauritania, Algeria, Niger, and other countries, and often brought Ansar along. Ghali now wore a Rolex watch, bespoke suits. and finely embroidered boubous, (“He was fascinating to people,” Ansar said, describing the many admirers who showered his friend with gifts), but he didn’t greedily pursue power or wealth. 

Nor did he practice his faith. Ansar prayed five times a day and fasted during Ramadan, but Ghali avoided prayers and never set foot in a mosque. “I was the good Muslim and he was the bad Muslim,” Ansar said. Ghali smoked, was reputed to be a big drinker—though Ansar never saw him touch a drop—and, when they traveled, was often out carousing all night. “People wanted to talk to him in the morning, and he just wanted to sleep,” Ansar recalled. “You could only bother him after 11:30.” 

Ansar frowned on such habits, but Ghali had earned his respect. During the factional fighting that had followed the breakdown of the peace in the early 1990s, Ghali’s men had brutally mistreated a captive, who later died. Ghali was infuriated when he learned of the crime, and he punished his men, he told Ansar. “He was a rebel commander, but he never condoned torture,” Ansar said. “He had a warrior’s code of honor.”

Ansar lived on the outskirts of Bamako, in a large house he had built for his family. (His wife gave birth to a daughter in 1995 and a son five years later.) He often hosted parties at which insurgents turned musicians were regular guests. As the evenings wore on, they would climb a spiral staircase to a rooftop known as La Terrasse des Fêtes, the Party Terrace, and listen to music and talk until dawn. On most Sundays, the friends gathered near the Niger River, a few miles outside Bamako, and held informal concerts hosted by Ghali and Ansar. Here, Alhabib and Alhousseyni would play for hours in the shade of a mango tree, typically joined by two female musicians, one playing the traditional imzad violin, the other the tindé drum.

The two former fighters formed the core of a group that had played together since they met in the Libyan rebel camps. Ansar became their manager, booking them into concert halls in Bamako. The rebellion was over, but they still sang songs about insurgency and the mythic Tuareg nation of Azawad. 

In 1999, the band accepted an invitation to play at a festival near Nantes, France. They chose La Groupe Azawad as their name. and Ansar booked flights and secured passports. They flew to Brussels Airport on Sabena Airlines, but when they arrived they were pulled aside for questioning. The police detained the group in a windowless cell after inquiring what the band, clad in traditional Tuareg veils and robes, were doing in Europe and whether they had sufficient funds. (They didn’t.) Seventy-two hours passed before the authorities finally released them. Alhousseyni commemorated the ordeal with a song: 

We thought we would arrive in paradise with Sabena 

Instead we ended up in prison with Sabena.

Despite the complications, the concert was a resounding success. Immediately after returning to Mali, Ansar decided that the name La Groupe Azawad was too politically charged, and he asked them to find an alternative. The musicians started calling themselves Kel Tinariwen, the People of the Desert, which was soon shortened to Tinariwen. 

Four

In January 2000, Ghali invited Ansar to Intejedit, a remote valley of rocks, reddish sand, and unearthly silence in northeastern Mali. Ansar traveled there by Jeep from Bamako, a three-and-a-half-day journey. This could be Mars, he thought as he drove through the scorched, barren land. The valley of Intejedit was fiercely hot. Barren sand dunes lie to the west, while in the east rose the Adrar des Ifoghas massif, a nearly impenetrable range of eroded sandstone and granite boulders surrounding sandy riverbeds.

Amid this striking scenery, Ghali had organized an event he called the Kidal Festival. Hundreds of Tuareg nomads had pitched goatskin tents around a makeshift stage. They slaughtered sheep and settled in for three days of music, camel races, and a camel “beauty pageant”—all arranged by Ghali to drum up tourism and development in the region. At Ghali’s request, Ansar had brought a Malian television crew to film the event for the national network. 

Ansar and Ghali were inseparable. They watched camels thunder down a sandy path, listened to Tinariwen perform, and soothed an angry Tuareg chieftain who felt that his clan had been shortchanged by the peace agreement. The festival culminated with the “dance of the camels,” featuring a group of Tuareg women draped in black who sat in a tight circle beating drums, chanting, and rhythmically clapping their hands. Tuareg riders in turquoise gowns and turbans led their camels, bearing richly embroidered saddles, in a circle around the women. “He was proud of how well the camels had been trained,” Ansar remembered. “He was proud of his culture and happy to have the chance to show it to me.” At the end, Ghali presented his friend with a large white camel—“the most beautiful animal I had ever seen,” Ansar said—as a token of their friendship. It was, Ghali told him, “the number one camel of Kidal.” 

During his days with Ghali at Intejedit, Ansar began to realize the potential of a commercial music festival in the Sahara, one that would attract Western tourists and musicians and promote Tuareg culture. He envisioned a roving concert series that would take place in a different venue each year and include Tuareg clans across the north, all of whom would share in jobs and revenues.

In January 2001, Ansar joined with members of Ghali’s clan, the Ifoghas, to produce the first official Festival in the Desert, also north of Kidal. Through his development group in Bamako, Ansar persuaded the embassies of France, Germany, and the United States, as well as Mali’s Ministry of Culture, to contribute financing for the three-day affair. The chief of Ghali’s clan organized tents, firewood, food, water, and provisions for the crowd; Ghali himself, a power broker in the region, assured Ansar that he would keep the visitors safe.

At the time, political tensions were roiling. Months earlier a recalcitrant Tuareg rebel and close friend of Ghali’s, Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, had turned against the peace pact and launched a small-scale rebellion near Kidal. Malian officials hoped to use the festival to dissuade Tuareg from joining Bahanga’s uprising. Conferences took place during the day, followed by music at night. One evening, to Ansar’s annoyance, the politicians ordered the producer to delay opening the concert because the meetings were dragging on. 

Ghali used the occasion to carry on his own clandestine peacemaking mission in cooperation with the Malian government. While Tinariwen performed on a makeshift stage in the sand, before Western ambassadors, government ministers, and 2,000 Tuareg men in cerulean robes, Ghali huddled on a dune a few hundred yards away with Mali’s prime minister and Bahanga, trying to talk the rebel leader into laying down his arms.  

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Festival entrance, Essakane. Photo: Alice Mutasa

Five

During the winter of 2002, around the time of the second Festival in the Desert, a friend in the Tuareg community told Ansar that a group of Muslim missionaries from Pakistan had arrived in Kidal, Ghali’s hometown, to preach their version of the religion to the Tuareg there. Mali’s Muslims are predominantly Sufist. Theirs is a tolerant, mystical form of Islam whose adherents venerate Muslim saints and chant wazifas, or the names of God. 

The missionaries who arrived, by contrast, belonged to the fundamentalist Tablighi Jamaat sect, which extols a return to the austere lifestyle led by the Prophet. Members of the group that came to Kidal sleep on rough mats and use twigs to brush their teeth. They spend a portion of every year on overseas proselytizing missions.

“The Pakistanis are up there converting all the former Tuareg rebels,” Ansar’s friend told him. “They’re all becoming devout.” Even Ghali, Ansar learned, was going to mosque now on a regular basis and had expressed keen interest in what these strict Muslims had to say. 

A year later, Ghali invited Ansar to visit him at his home. When he entered, he found Ghali seated on the floor, absorbed in a copy of the Koran. Ansar had never seen him reading the Holy Book before. Soon after, Ghali again summoned Ansar to his home and began to lecture him. He thumbed through the Hadith, the sayings of the Prophet, and told his friend that life is “like a waiting room in an airport when you are in transit,” a brief interlude before the “real journey” begins. “You had better be prepared,” he admonished. Ghai pressed Ansar to cancel the Festival in the Desert. It was a “materialistic pursuit,” he said, that “won’t speak well for you before God after you are dead.” He handed Ansar a book about the proper way to pray and urged Ansar to read the book and put it into practice. 

Ansar fended him off gently, defending the festival as a source of much needed hope and jobs. “Leave me alone for five more years, and when I turn 50, I’m going to stop everything and follow your advice.”

“No, that’s too late,” Ghali replied. “You don’t know if you’re going to die today.” 

Soon after, Ghali invited Ansar to meet him at a Salafist mosque. Salafism is a radical branch of Islam that worships the Prophet and his original followers, the salaf, or ancestors. Ansar arrived to find Ghali seated on a mattress in a small prayer room, a stubbly beard forming on his cheeks. Delighted that Ansar had come, Ghali suggested that he spend the entire weekend there. Ansar looked at the cramped cubicles, the dirty mattresses, the bearded acolytes, and politely declined.

Ghali had given up his rich diet of lamb and couscous, his bespoke suits and embroidered boubous. He seemed to subsist on nothing but milk and dates, and he dressed in a white djellaba, a long Middle Eastern robe, and short trousers that ended well above his ankles, as favored by fundamentalist Muslims. He removed all photographs and paintings from his house, made his wife wear the veil known as the hijab, and kept her confined to home. And he began giving away his prized possessions, handing his expensive Rolex watch to another former Tuareg rebel. Ghali confided to Ansar that he was saying “twice as many prayers” as those required by Islam, because “of all the things I have done that I regret.”

Ansar was mystified by his friend’s devotion but tried to remain open to it. “He was always smiling,” Ansar said, “like a child.” 

“You must not lose yourself entirely in religion,” Ansar told him. “You were the one who created these problems for the state and for the society, so you have to stay in charge, to maintain the peace.” 

Ghali waved him off. 

When I spoke with Ghali’s old musician friend Alhousseyni of Tinariwen, he told me that Ghali “began to lose his friends, his acquaintances, and he became solitary. He entered a different world.”

In 2003, Ansar moved the festival across the Sahara to Essakane, west of Timbuktu, a remote and otherworldly sea of dunes that served as a traditional gathering place for his clan, the Kel Antassar. The British guitarist Justin Adams arrived to play with Tinariwen, whose first album he had recently helped produce. Adams was joined by Led Zeppelin’s Robert Plant, who jammed with Tinariwen and Ali Farka Touré before an audience that included hundreds of foreign tourists. Thanks to Plant, the festival drew media attention around the world. It also produced some awkward encounters. Vicki Huddleston, who had just arrived in Mali as the new U.S. ambassador, reached Essakane on the festival’s first afternoon. Huddleston made her way to a section reserved for diplomats and briefly inspected her designated tent, marked by an American flag flying out front. When she returned late in the afternoon, she noted with puzzlement that the flag had been removed. 

“Is somebody in there?” Huddleston’s public affairs officer inquired, standing outside the tent.

Out stepped Robert Plant. 

“This is the ambassador’s tent,” the officer said.

“But I am ambassador to the world,” Plant protested, before surrendering the quarters to Huddleston.

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Preparations for the 2003 festival in Essakane, west of Timbuktu. Photo: Nadia Nid El-Mourid

In the spring of 2003, an organization calling itself the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, based in Algeria, kidnapped a group of European tourists—most of them German—on a desert highway and led them on a punishing hike south through the Sahara, to the Adrar des Ifoghas massif.

Mali’s president, Amadou Toumani Touré, realized that he had a radical Islamic threat inside his borders and reached out to Ghali for help. The leader of the group, a former Algerian paratrooper who called himself El Para, offered to free the hostages in exchange for a ransom from the German government, and Touré asked Ghali to make the deal. 

Surrounded by barren hills, the Tuareg negotiator and the Arab terrorists sat on blankets in a dried-out riverbed and discussed terms. El Para agreed to a five-million-euro ransom, and Ghali delivered the money, flown down from Germany in a government jet, in a batch of suitcases. The hostages were freed immediately, earning Ghali the goodwill of both the Malian government and the jihadists. 

Soon after, Huddleston met with Ghali in Kidal. Huddleston and other American officials worried that the Germans’ five-million-euro payment would enable the Saharan radicals to buy weapons and recruit jihadists. They were also concerned about Ghali and his flirtation with fundamentalism. In 1998, John Walker Lindh, a young American, had traveled with preachers from Ghali’s sect, Tablighi Jamaat, to Pakistan and soon joined the Taliban. Zacarias Moussaoui, the only person charged in the United States for the September 11 attacks, regularly attended a Tablighi Jamaat mosque in France. 

For half an hour, Ghali and the ambassador talked about the state of things in the north and the importance of keeping the Tuareg at peace for the sake of development. Huddleston noted his piercing eyes and full beard, the flowing white robe and intricately folded head scarf typically worn by Tuareg. He looked, she thought, like a classic desert warrior. When she pressed him about possible ties with Islamic terror groups, Ghali assured her that he had no interest in their cause.  

Vieux Farka Touré performs. Video: Joe Conte/Ola TV

Six

As the festival grew, Ansar began to believe that it could help unite all of Mali through music. Although he was growing distant from Ghali, he took solace in the fact that the festival that Ghali had inspired was providing jobs to Tuareg and establishing Timbuktu as an international tourist destination. Western journalists and diplomats were praising Mali as a symbol of hope and freedom on a deeply troubled continent. And stars from around the world were clamoring to appear at Essakane.

Around 2007, Ansar began receiving warnings from Tuareg elders that a new movement of Islamic jihadists in the Sahara, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, viewed the festival as an abomination. The group was made up of some of the same Algerian jihadists whom Ghali had first encountered in 2003, when he negotiated the release of the European tourists being held by El Para. “They are saying that you’re spreading debauchery, that you’ve created some kind of Sodom and Gomorrah in Essakane,” he was told. And yet, AQIM never attacked the festival, and the radicals—who had begun seizing Western tourists and aid workers across northern Africa and holding them for ransom—never attempted a kidnapping in or around Essakane. When I asked Ansar why, he said he couldn’t be sure, but he believed that his longtime friend was quietly protecting it—and him—from violence.  

Outsiders, meanwhile, had little idea of the tension behind the scenes. I visited the Festival in the Desert in 2008, at the height of its popularity, when 8,000 people came to Essakane, a quarter of them Westerners. Tourists in safari jackets filled the sandy streets of Timbuktu. They flooded the markets and packed their rented Land Cruisers with tents, coolers, bottled water, food, first-aid kits, extra fuel, GPS devices, and other supplies for the two-hour journey down a rough track through the desert.

The festival was a grand, unforgettable scene. White canvas tents and traditional nomadic dwellings stitched together from the hides of goats dotted the wind-rippled white dunes. After a day in the heat and a communal meal with a party of young Australians on a months-long trek through Africa, I fell asleep in a tent before midnight. Two hours later, awakening to an infectious guitar phrase, I scaled a 50-foot-high dune overlooking the floodlit stage. I lay back on the cool sand, stared at a sky filled with stars, and let the hypnotic vocals and guitar licks of Ibrahim Ag Alhabib, Tinariwen’s lead singer, wash over me.

Tinariwen perform. Video: Joe Conte/Ola TV

In late 2008, Ghali informed Ansar that he had accepted a diplomatic assignment to the Malian consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

“I want to be close to the Great Mosque of Mecca, where I can pray every Friday,” Ghali said.

Ansar was appalled. He couldn’t understand why Ghali would leave the country for an inconsequential post, especially at a time when Tuareg insurgents were stirring again and radical Islamists had begun kidnapping Western tourists, aid workers, and diplomats in the north. Ghali had recently negotiated on behalf of the government and freed hundreds of soldiers captured by a Tuareg splinter group around Kidal. “God gave you this intelligence, the power to find solutions,” Ansar argued. “You don’t have the right to leave it all behind.”  

Ghali said that he was tired of the internecine warfare between Tuareg factions, and tired of Malian politics in general. He wanted out, and he was searching for a new direction. A few weeks later, Ghali boarded a plane for Jeddah. But after less than a year he returned to Mali, with newspapers reporting that he had been expelled from Saudi Arabia for allegedly making contacts with radicals.

Ansar shrugged off the news. In fact, he would later admit, he was pleased that Ghali had been forced to leave a dead-end job in Saudi Arabia, auguring a possible return to a domestic political role. Ansar continued to regard Ghali as a “great man,” he said, “who had always been respectful toward me, in spite of my resistance to his offers to lead me along the ‘right path.’” He regarded his piety as a good thing, on balance. “I had nothing against someone who transformed himself into a monk,” he would say years later, “to leave behind all the good things in life in order to nourish his faith.”

“Are you sure you’re not heading down the road of violence?” Ansar asked him upon his return. Ghali shook his head emphatically. “We are pacifists,” he said.

When they met again in February 2010 by chance in a roadside restaurant north of Bamako, Ghali was far less warm. Ansar was driving north to the Festival on the Niger, a five-day concert event set on a barge in the river. This time, Ansar said, Ghali stared at him with contempt, offering an unspoken rebuke to his former friend for continuing his passion for music.

It was the last time the two men would see each other, but it wasn’t long before Ansar realized how fully his friend had immersed himself in his fundamentalist faith and violent Islam.

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Fighters from Ansar Dine in the desert outside Timbuktu. Photo: Associated Press 

Seven

In December 2010, Tunisians rose up against President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, a repressive figure whose free-spending wife had come to epitomize institutional corruption. The Tunisian revolution inspired Egyptians to demand the resignation of Hosni Mubarak, who fell weeks later. Soon it was Gaddhafi’s turn. In Benghazi, in eastern Libya, security forces killed many protesters, and rebellion spread. NATO forces, acting on a United Nations Security Council resolution, attacked Gaddhafi’s army. Gaddhafi called on the Tuareg of Mali for help, and several thousand answered his plea. Despite their help, Tripoli fell in late August. In the ensuing chaos, Tuareg looters ripped off the gates of arsenals across Libya and filled their trucks with heavy weapons. Then they headed back across the desert to Mali.

Ghali, meanwhile, was plotting his next move after his disgraceful expulsion from Saudi Arabia. He watched with keen interest as a rebel movement, consisting of secular Tuareg, coalesced in northern Mali. That fall he drove to the camp of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, as the group now called itself, and made a bid to become its commander. But Ghali had few diehard supporters left among the Tuareg rebels, some of whom viewed him with suspicion because of his longtime ties to the government; others were repelled by his fundamentalist leanings. The rebels rejected him.

A short time later, in Kidal, Ghali established his own rebel movement, Ansar Dine—Defenders of the Faith—consisting of Tuareg who embraced fundamentalist Islam. Ghali made an alliance with AQIM, whose confidence he’d won years earlier by arranging the five-million-euro ransom for the German hostages. 

Ghali’s new Islamist coalition soon proposed a partnership with the nonreligious Tuareg rebels who were encamped, with their heavy weapons, in the northern desert. The secular rebels were deeply divided. Some viewed the Al Qaeda fighters as criminals, killers, and international outcasts, and wanted nothing to do with them. The majority, however, saw the alliance in opportunistic terms. By merging their men and their heavy arms with AQIM and Iyad Ag Ghali’s Ansar Dine, they would likely roll over the Malian army and achieve their long-held dream—Azawad.

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Iyad Ag Ghali (second from right) with Tuareg fighters. Photo: Corbis

Four days after the Festival in the Desert, on January 18, Ghali and the Ansar Dine rebels attacked an army camp in a remote village in northeast Mali. They overran the compound, then lined up nearly 100 soldiers and civilians and executed them, either by slitting their throats or shooting them in the head. The French government accused Ghali of Al Qaeda tactics. 

“My God,” Ansar exclaimed when he saw his old friend in combat gear, surrounded by armed jihadist fighters, on Malian TV. “He always swore to me that his Islam would never become violent.” 

The insurgents were growing in number, capturing weaponry and moving freely through the desert. In Bamako, mobs attacked businesses run by Tuareg. The president pleaded for calm. 

“Do not confuse those [Tuareg] who are shooting at military bases with those who are living amongst us, who are our neighbors, our colleagues,” he said on state television, but the message didn’t get through. 

“It’s you who have destroyed the country,” one man shouted at Ansar as he was stopped in traffic in downtown Bamako. 

In Bamako, threats against Tuareg intensified. As the situation worsened, Ansar flew with his family to Ouagadougou, the capital of neighboring Burkina Faso. A few weeks later, President Touré arrived there on a state visit. In his hotel suite, Touré pleaded with Ansar to return to Bamako, promising that the situation was stable. The Tuareg population in the south felt vulnerable and afraid, he said, and he believed that Ansar’s return would send a positive signal to them. Even now, Ansar realized, Touré failed to understand the enormity of what was happening in his country. His military was collapsing, Mali disintegrating. Ansar’s eyes filled with tears—Touré took his hand, and then the president teared up, too. 

In a show of fidelity to the president, Ansar left his wife and children in Burkina Faso and returned home on the presidential plane. But days later, Touré and his wife fled the palace ahead of a gang of marauding soldiers, taking refuge first in the Senegalese embassy, and later going into exile in Dakar. 

A junior army officer seized control of the government. Across the north, the military quickly collapsed. Soldiers fled south, abandoning an area the size of France—stretching from the Algerian border to Mali’s Inner Niger Delta—to the rebel army. By late March, two-thirds of the country was under rebel control. On April 1, Ghali led a convoy of 100 vehicles flying black jihadist flags into Timbuktu. 

Ghali declared war on the north’s musicians, whom he now believed to be a threat to the Islamic state that he had nearly formed. Members of Tinariwen fled to California. In Niafounké, an oasis town that lent its name to an album by the late desert-blues master Ali Farka Touré, Ghali’s fighters threatened to chop off the fingers of the singer’s protégés. In the summer of 2012, Ansar Dine militants trashed the studio of Khaira Arby, a popular half-Tuareg, half-Arab diva known as the Nightingale of the North, and threatened to cut out her tongue if they captured her, forcing her to flee to Bamako from Timbuktu. A few weeks later, Ansar Dine vandalized the house of Ahmed Ag Kaedi, a Tuareg guitarist from Kidal, taking special care to douse his guitars in gasoline and set them on fire.  

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Khaira Arby. Photo: Alice Mutasa

The militants set up a Sharia court in the former La Maison hotel, where Bono had stayed during the festival three months earlier, and meted out medieval punishments without mercy. They lashed women caught with their faces uncovered, chopped off the hands and feet of suspected thieves, and stoned an unmarried couple to death. 

In December, Ghali and his partners in Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb gathered several hundred jihadists for a war conference near Essakane, the former site of the Festival in the Desert. Between prayers and grilled lamb, they set a date of mid-January for the conquest of the remaining third of the country. When Ansar heard about the gathering, he was certain that Ghali had chosen the area to rebuke him for refusing to close down the festival. As Ansar said, “He was telling me, ‘This place is no longer for singing and dancing, no longer for debauchery, no longer for the hippies of the world. This place is now for jihad.’”

In January 2013, jihadists drove hundreds of pickup trucks mounted with heavy weapons toward the government front lines, where ill-trained soldiers were charged with preventing the rebels from breaking through to the south. In a savage battle, the jihadists killed dozens and sent the rest fleeing into the bush. Ghali and his men were just eight hours from the capital now, and Ansar suspected that AQIM and Ansar Dine were mobilizing jihadist cells inside Bamako to facilitate their entry.

In Paris, President François Hollande followed the events with alarm. The prospect of a radical terrorist state in the former French colony, of the potential kidnapping and execution of French citizens, prodded him into action. He ordered armed helicopters stationed in nearby Burkina Faso to launch a counterattack. The choppers fired rockets at the militants’ vehicles. French jets from Chad followed, and with support from tanks on the ground, dozens of rebels were killed. 

A convoy of blood-streaked pickup trucks, led by Iyad Ag Ghali, made its way back toward Timbuktu. Ghali had gambled that his lightning strike against the south would overwhelm the government forces, never imagining that a powerful Western army would intervene so quickly. 

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Tuareg on camels at sunset. Photo: Alice Mutasa

Eight

I met Manny Ansar for the first time a few days after the French intervention. He was sitting at a table in the outdoor bar of the guesthouse in Bamako, where I was staying, overlooking the Niger River. The haunting music of Ali Farka Touré was playing softly on the bar’s sound system. 

Ansar was a slender man in his early fifties, with a receding hairline, a narrow face, and a thin mustache. He wore jeans, sandals, and a loose-fitting, open-necked white shirt. Ansar seemed distracted, dazed by the dramatic turn of events, and still bewildered by his friend’s transformation. “I don’t understand what happened to him,” he said, going back and forth between English and French. “I could see that he had become radicalized, but I never thought that he would be capable of senseless violence.” Ansar acknowledged that Ghali might have become hardened to warfare and killing as a boy, but he had believed that the Tuareg leader’s embrace of religion had changed his life for the better. “Never violence,” he repeated. 

Even now, I thought, he seemed to be in a state of denial about Ghali’s crimes. Ansar said he heard that Ghali had been “furious” when his men overran the military camp in northern Mali in January 2012 and, in the war’s most notorious episode, killed nearly 100 people. And he was sure that Ghali had not been behind the most heinous applications of Sharia law. “I never had any proof that Iyad punished anyone who listened to music or that he tortured or executed anyone,” he insisted. “I hope that I never have such proof.” And yet it was hard to believe that Ghali’s men would have disobeyed their powerful commander; plenty of witnesses I talked to later would describe Ghali as being intimately and actively involved in every stage of the war and the brutal occupation of northern Mali. 

The Festival in the Desert had been canceled that year, and Ansar had little idea about its future or his own prospects. Ghali’s fate seemed equally unclear. Days after my first encounter with Ansar, as French forces advanced on Timbuktu, Ghali fled north from Kidal and disappeared. According to conflicting reports, he had either taken temporary refuge in Mauritania or was hiding in a mountainous region of Darfur, in western Sudan. For the moment, he appeared safe from the French special forces who were tracking down jihadists across Mali by air and by road.

When I returned to Mali a year later, sporadic rocket attacks and ambushes of French troops and civilians in the north had forced Ansar to cancel the festival for the second year in a row, but he had found a temporary solution. Ansar had organized a series of “concerts in exile” to keep the music of the north alive, and he invited me to join him at a performance of northern musicians at the Festival on the Niger in Ségou, a southern town that had never been occupied by the jihadists. 

We walked along the riverbank at dusk while waiting for the first night’s performance. On this stretch of the river, in December 1893, French officers and Senegalese infantrymen boarded a gunboat for Timbuktu—only to be massacred a month later by warriors led by Ansar’s great-great-grandfather. Ansar was a direct descendant of perhaps the greatest Tuareg rebel, yet he had been driven all his life by a yearning to knit his country together.  

At 10 p.m., Ahmed Ag Kaedi, the Tuareg musician whose instruments had been burned by Ghali’s men, climbed onto the stage with his band. Clad in boubous and veils, the men sang of the desolate beauty of the Sahara, the joys of companionship, and the loneliness of exile. To the sound of their call-and-response vocals and hypnotically repetitive guitars, ecstatic spectators rushed the small stage, surrounding Kaedi. Ansar danced among them, swept up by the music.

Soon after my visit to the Festival on the Niger, Malian and Algerian journalists reported that Iyad Ag Ghali’s whereabouts were known to security forces in the region. He was said to be hiding in the oasis of Tinzouatine, the no-man’s-land between Algeria and Mali. In exchange for immunity, Ghali had offered to negotiate for the release of Western hostages seized by Al Qaeda. The U.S. State Department had named Ghali a Specially Designated Global Terrorist and rejected any possibility of a deal with him. But the French and Algerian security forces seemed to have little interest in pursuing him. Ghali’s influence among the Tuareg remained considerable, and it was widely believed that no final agreement between the armed nomads and the government could be achieved without his approval. “Iyad has lived many lives,” Ansar told me, predicting that he would eventually resurface as a major political player in Mali. 

As for Ansar, he was forced to cancel the Festival in the Desert for the third consecutive year, and he had little hope that it would come together for 2016. Despite the presence of French and U.N. peacekeepers, the radical Islamists were resurgent. In February 2015, they launched a deadly attack in Kidal. In March, terrorists struck Bamako for the first time, firing on a café popular with expatriates. Five people, including a Frenchman and a Belgian, were killed. No place in Mali seemed safe, and the possibility of reconciliation between the north and the south seemed remote. The musicians of Tinariwen, who had been forced to flee into exile, now traveled throughout the West, still singing about their dream—the nation of Azawad.

The Last Clinic

An Emmy-nominated portrait of the last abortion clinic in Mississippi.

The Atavist Magazine, No. 21


Maisie Crow is a photographer and multimedia producer based in Brooklyn. She has done work for The Boston Globe, Bread for the World, MediaStorm, The New York Times, the Robin Hood Foundation, Save the Children, and the Virginia Quarterly Review, among others. Maisie has taught as an adjunct professor at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism and as a multimedia instructor at the Salt Institute for Documentary Studies.

Alissa Quart is the author of two nonfiction books, Branded and Hothouse Kids. Her next book is forthcoming in 2013. She has written longform pieces for Mother Jones, The New York Times Magazine, and many other publications. She was a 2010 Nieman Fellow at Harvard, is a contributing editor and author of the Reality Check column for the Columbia Journalism Review, and teaches in the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism.

Editor: Evan Ratliff
Producers: Olivia Koski, Gray Beltran
Copy Editor: Sean Cooper
Fact Checker: Thomas Stackpole
Research and Production: Nadia Wilson

Published in January 2013. Design updated in February 2021.


Watch the full documentary above.

It was the week before Thanksgiving, 2012, and Dr. Willie Parker was making small talk with a group of patients in one of the back rooms of an abortion clinic in Jackson, Mississippi. What are your plans for the holidays? What’s your mother cooking? They laughed as they discussed turkey and dressing. After a bit more chatter, Parker got serious. “I hope this will get done what you want to get done,” he said as an assistant went around the room, dispensing a single pill per person, along with a small plastic cup of water.

Some of the half-dozen young women in the room were awkward, others assured. They were skinny, overweight; some were still in braces. Some were in high school and had mothers waiting for them in the next room. Some had children at home. They laughed, in some combination of nervousness and, perhaps, surprise at their own ease with the situation.

“If you feel nauseated, eat some Jolly Ranchers,” Parker continued. “Which flavor do you like?” Parker was usually learned in his speech, but he was going “colloquial” today, as he put it. Like most of his patients, he is black and from the South. In his fifties, he reminded some of them of their fathers and uncles—or of how they wished their fathers and uncles were in their moment of crisis. All the girls were receiving mifepristone, the so-called abortion pill. Within the next few hours, they would start to cramp, and their pregnancies would terminate. The girls had all had one-on-one counseling. The group setting was for general information, required by the state.

Parker is an abortion provider. But he is also the plaintiff in a case that has become a highly theatrical political maelstrom, one with potentially extreme consequences for the clinic where he works, and perhaps for abortion clinics around the nation.

This clinic, Jackson Women’s Health Organization, is a bleak white concrete building surrounded by fencing. A security guard stands watch outside. Inside, it’s a warm place painted pink, yellow, and red, and alive with the volubility and vivaciousness of its workers. From within its walls, you can be lulled into forgetting that you are inside Mississippi’s Alamo of reproductive rights.

This is the last abortion clinic in the state. In April 2012, the Mississippi legislature passed House Bill 1390, requiring that abortion providers obtain “admitting privileges,” an official status that grants providers the ability to admit patients at one or more local hospitals. Any clinic without admitting privileges would be shut down. It’s a maneuver intended to eliminate abortion here—Republican governor Phil Bryant has called the law “the first step in a movement, I believe, to do what we campaigned on: to say that we’re going to try to end abortion in Mississippi.”

The clinic and its advocates challenged the law, and in July 2012, a federal court offered a reprieve, blocking its implementation and giving the facility until January to comply. The next, and potentially decisive, hearing arrives at the end of January. If the state wins, young women like the ones sitting in the clinic’s red leatherette chairs will be forced to travel across Mississippi state lines to terminate their pregnancies. Most of them had already traveled to get to Jackson, from places like Hattiesburg and Yazoo City and smaller towns scattered across the state, and they had been required by law to wait 24 hours for the procedure once they got there.

But the effort to close down the clinic would also represent an “enormous victory” for the pro-life movement overall, said Carole Joffe, a longtime scholar of abortion rights at the University of California at Davis. “There’s a competition within the red states to see if they can be the first to close all the clinics.” As Joffe put it, channeling Tolstoy, “Each red-state attack on each abortion clinic is unhappy in its own way.” What she means is that state legislatures have many different approaches to trying to close clinics, from insisting that providers have admitting privileges to creating new rules for clinics’ medical supplies, the amount of staff required, the length of patients’ waiting periods, and even a clinic’s architecture. In Virginia, for instance, the state legislature recently adopted regulations stipulating the location of bathrooms and the size of the hallways within clinics.

Roe v. Wade became the law of the land 40 years ago, making abortion a constitutional right in all 50 states. Thus, the end of Mississippi’s clinics would also be historic: a single state successfully flouting the Constitution, hoping by its action to force America back in time.

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The bill’s supporters have argued that requiring hospital admitting privileges are an attempt to protect women from incompetent or even exploitative abortions. And outside the clinic, protesters were eager to talk about the procedure’s medical risks. I passed them as they sat on foldable lawn chairs, handing out leaflets and little squishy models of fetuses.

Ester Mann, 64, was one of those protesters. She had been picketing the Jackson clinic for many years and had been arrested twice. As the choice war flares up again in Mississippi, but also in Michigan, Kansas, and Tennessee, the battle lines remain the same, but the strategies and positions of both sides, legal and otherwise, have evolved. Mann, who offered a tearful tirade against the doctors at the clinic, didn’t use the same old pro-life rhetoric. In fact, she eagerly called herself a “Jesus feminist.” What did she mean by this? Mann, a large woman dressed in a royal blue outfit, smiled at me. “Jesus loved women,” she said. “And I believe in equal pay for equal work.”

Mann spoke of the women who came to the clinic as “disdaining God” and the “precious gift” of pregnancy. Mann herself was only able to have a single child. “Here I was, unable to have babies,” she recalled of her early years protesting. She was eager for January and the judge’s decision, praying for the clinic’s closure.

Beyond the rhetoric outside, however, the real threat to the clinic was contained in Bill 1390. As of January, Dr. Parker and the other physicians at the clinic have been rejected by all seven of the area’s local hospitals, making compliance with the law impossible. Ironically, the chaos of the protesters is one reason the hospitals have denied those privileges. One hospital replied to the clinic’s request that granting admitting privileges to abortion doctors “would lead to both an internal and external disruption of the Hospital’s function and business within this community.” Five rejected the clinic outright because they were opposed to being associated with an abortion provider, according to the Center for Reproductive Rights.

Twenty-five years ago, the factor limiting abortion care was a shortage of doctors capable of performing the procedure. But now, after the development of training programs like the one at University of Michigan, where Parker attended, the limitation on abortion care is geographical accessibility. There are plenty of providers in Seattle and New York City but not many working in rural areas. As a result, doctors like Parker—who typically flies down from his home in Washington, D.C., once a month and stays in Mississippi for a few days—may travel hundreds of miles to provide abortions. The expense of those trips multiplies the substantial cost of abortion services. Already, clinics are forced to fund mandatory security guards, legal expenses, and 24-hour video surveillance.

For the patients in Mississippi, abortion could become more expensive still. If the clinic is closed, reaching an out-of-state facility will require at least a three-day trip. Beyond the travel time, there are mandatory 24-hour waiting periods in several nearby states, including Louisiana, Arkansas, Texas, and Georgia. Many of these women are among the poorest in the country, and the end of an in-state clinic could well mean the end of choice for some of them. First there are the hundreds of dollars for bus fare or gas and a hotel room. Then there are the lost wages and, perhaps, childcare for their other children. The procedure itself typically runs $450, although the cost can be higher for pregnancies that are further along. (Several of the women I spoke to said they had requested and received money from an organization called the National Abortion Federation.)

Mississippi isn’t the only state which risks losing abortion care entirely. It’s one of five states with only one clinic remaining, along with Arkansas and the sparsely-populated North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming. The spokesperson of the pro-life group 40 Days for Life has said that likeminded activists have targeted these states, too, hoping to bring about the “the first abortion-free state where abortion is legal but it’s simply not available.” The organization Missionaries for the Preborn has also announced that they have focused on states with one clinic, calling them “states of refuge.” According to a statement from the group, “Pro-lifers will wage an ongoing campaign in these five states” until January 22, 2013, the anniversary of Roe. Closing the Jackson clinic is a key part of the pro-life movement’s pursuit to outlaw abortion for good.

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It was business as usual as the January decision settling the clinic’s fate approached. In late November, the clinic’s waiting room was full, an old Jamie Foxx show filling it with canned laughter. A depressed-looking girl in Ugg-style boots sat staring at her phone, next to someone else’s boyfriend, young and plump, with a beard, who stared at his. A sign on the door read “No Purses, No Bags, No Children.”

The clinic’s director, 40-year-old Shannon Brewer-Anderson, mother of six, walked around the facility, making sure that what she referred to as the state’s “severe regulations” were being  followed. “If we have a lightbulb busted or a stain in the carpet, we get written up,” she said. The Department of Health would visit often, sometimes as much as eight times a year, spurred by “complaints from people outside,” said Brewer. “Everything having to do with an abortion,” she says, “is political.”

On each day I observed him in Mississippi, Parker—one of two doctors who alternate at the clinic—shifted between counseling future patients and performing abortion procedures. In counseling, patients receive general information about both medical and surgical abortion, including certain statements required by law. Counselors must underline the dangers of the procedures, although in truth abortions are less dangerous than giving birth—something Parker pointed out after running through the state-mandated boilerplate. They must inform patients that having an abortion raises a woman’s chance of breast cancer, although there is “not a shred of scientific evidence to support that,” as Parker told his patients.  

As I roamed through the rooms, the contrast was stark with the quieter, more anonymous clinics I had visited in New York City. There, staffers were unlikely to know any of the patients personally, let alone assure them that their secret was safe, as Mississippi staffers told me they had done. There were many clinics where patients might never learn their doctors’ names. But not here.

I spoke to some of the patients as they waited for counseling or abortions. I met Hillary from Yazoo City, who worked in an auto shop. She was 22 and had two children: One had been born at two pounds and the other at four pounds. Why had both her babies been born so small? “Bad prenatal care,” she said. “I was wishing it away.” Hillary was tall and thin, with a cloth flower in her hair. “I want to provide. I don’t have enough money to provide for my kids now,” she said. She was unmarried and barely earned minimum wage. She said she hoped to get her “tubes tied,” permanently preventing her from having children, even though she was young. I sat with her and other young women as they were instructed in where a woman’s vagina is, where the cervix is, and breathing techniques for the procedure—breathe in through the nose, out through the mouth.

When a clinic counselor explained to Hillary that she would have to stay off her feet for several days following her abortion, she shook her head. “I lift in my job,” she said. “Well, try and stay off your feet, hide in the closet, take a long lunch,” the counselor said. Hillary was afraid to lose her job, she said.

So was 21-year-old police trainee Sara, who said she’d have to leave the police academy if she remained pregnant. “It’s against the law to be out on the road pregnant as a police officer,” she explained. She wasn’t telling her “very religious Baptist family” about it and had to come up with excuses for the two and a half hours she drove each way to get here. “I had to cover it up, as I live with my family,” Sara said. “I had the pill because I want to be on my own, in a room with the door closed, and able to hide it from my family.”

I spoke to Aarimis, who worked at the clinic as an assistant but had first visited as a patient. She had had a total of four pregnancies and terminations, starting when she was 14. One pregnancy had come along when she was with a boyfriend who physically abused her. She said she still struggled to afford the monthly $80 out of pocket for birth control.

There was also a teenager, sitting next to her mom, who everyone in the waiting room thought was a basketball player because of her height and athletic clothes. That a teen was there to terminate her pregnancy wasn’t surprising: Mississippi has the highest birthrate among teens in the nation, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. In 2010, there were 55 births per 1,000 teens aged 15 to 19 in the state, compared with a national average of 34.2. Even more troubling is the data showing the likelihood that the infants born to teenagers may not survive. In Mississippi, babies are at far greater risk of dying before their first birthday than in any other state in the nation. In 2011, 9.4 babies out of every 1,000 died. That’s similar to infant mortality in Botswana last year—10 out of 1,000. Mississippi is also one of only two states to demand that a minor receive consent from both parents to have an abortion.

In addition to poverty, religion was a powerful presence in the clinic’s bright back rooms, where batches of young women sat clad in their day clothes or pale hospital gowns. A few girls who were about to get the procedure told me that they thought it was wrong, that they worried about standing before God. One white woman told me she was having an abortion because the father was black (“a football player”) and her parents wouldn’t accept the child were she to carry it to term. “There’s no way I can go through this pregnancy, my family being as racist as they are,” she said.

Of the young women I encountered, the most charismatic was Adriana (her middle name), from Hattiesburg. “This is my second time,” she told me. She was 23 and worked at a bingo hall, and her boyfriend wanted her to have the baby, “but I’m the only one working: He doesn’t work.”

“I’ve been love-drunk all my life, you know,” she said. “I want to join the Air Force. That would help me get myself together.”

Adriana’s belief that terminating her pregnancy might help her gain greater solvency and ultimately achieve more professionally is supported by some compelling new data. A research study called the Turnaway Project, begun in 2008 at the University of California at San Francisco, examined three sample groups of poor women, recruited at abortion clinics around the country. One group had been turned away from a clinic, another group had carried their pregnancies to term, and a third had had abortions. One year later, 76 percent of the women in the study who were denied abortions were on welfare, compared with 44 percent overall. The women who had sought abortions but hadn’t received them were also less likely to be working and far more likely to be living below the poverty line.

With its inaccessibility looming, abortion in Mississippi could become something of a new social-class marker if opponents have their way. A middle-class woman with an unintended pregnancy will be able to drive to Texas; many others won’t be able to leave work long enough to make the trip. And the women I met at the clinic were among the poorest in the country—according to the census bureau. In 2011, Mississippi had a poverty rate of 22.6 percent—nearly one in four. Its median household income was $36,919.

Given the financial straits of these women, no one is quite sure what will happen to those who rely on the place if Jackson’s clinic closes. As a woman in the waiting room put it, “Thank God this is still an option for my daughter. She is only 17.”

Dr. Parker riffed with his patients about their eating habits, dating, even their constipation. To one of the counselors at the clinic, “Miss Betty,” he offered an adage about dating in middle age: “Old enough to know what to do but young enough to still want to.” His jabs at earthy humor were meant to put both his colleagues and his daily allotment of patients—around a dozen or two—at greater ease. He called this palaver “verbocaine.” He used it all day long, especially as he could offer only a local anesthetic before surgeries. General anesthesia was not available; administering it would require hiring a nurse anesthetist, and the clinic already struggled to find nursing support. Nor does the clinic provide prescription painkillers, as tracking them on-site would be too labor intensive.

When Parker was not talking or performing procedures, he sat serenely in his office. On one break, he ate what he called a “cardiac” breakfast of bacon and eggs, loading up for the dozens of operations in front of him. He spoke of Martin Luther King, and likened the battle for reproductive rights to King’s civil rights campaign. He spoke about Dr. King’s understanding of the Good Samaritan and explained how his notion of medical care was more about the person needing help than the person giving it. He had been forced to stop worrying about his own safety, he said, and the Christian component of Parker’s drive was underlined by the “Pro-faith, Pro-family, Pro-Christian” sign affixed to a clinic wall.

Parker, who is unmarried and has no children, grew up poor in Birmingham. He never knew his father and was “raised by committee,” as he put it. He had a “fundamentalist” upbringing, he said, and even proselytized to others. He was educated at a small Southern Christian school, Berea College in Kentucky, and then attended the University of Iowa Medical School. He came to abortion care in midlife, after many years as a gynecologist. Making the shift went against the values of his upbringing. “I grew up in the black church, and I was conflicted about what it would mean to help women with their unplanned pregnancies,” he said. But then he had an epiphany. He realized that “a safe and early abortion was the Christian thing. After that, I became less worried about myself.” His revelation came, he explained, when he re-envisioned Christianity as “a love ethic, especially around the doctrine of compassion.” Part of that compassion, he concluded, involved helping these young women with nowhere else to turn. His own grandmother, he told me, had died in childbirth.

Parker began performing abortions about 10 years ago, after he graduated from the University of Michigan program, working at clinics in Philadelphia and D.C. It was a struggle even up north, due to what Parker described as “the stigma” around having and providing abortions. This ostensible disgrace prompted many providers to be less candid about what they did, to couch their work in euphemism and hide their identities for their own safety. The stigma manifested itself in small ways for Dr. Parker, as well—few patients came back and thanked him, for instance. An abortion is usually something women would rather forget, and the poorer patients at the clinics Parker worked at were usually “putting out lots of other fires” in their lives, as he put it. The one patient who had kept up a friendship with him was a woman who learned of rare genetic abnormalities late in her first and second pregnancies. Parker did the procedures after she and her husband chose to abort. Just this summer, the woman had a healthy baby and invited him to the newborn’s bris.

It was the taint of the procedure, he thought, that led his patients to ask him, as they sat on the examining table, whether they would be punished. “They fear divine will and divine intervention. They’ll ask, ‘Do you think God will kill me for killing my baby?’”

Stigma or no, abortion was Parker’s avocation as well as his vocation—that was why he started working in Jackson in May. He was contacted about the job half a year before he began traveling down, and he felt an immediate pull. He had read about the impending law and had a strong sense that he was needed. Nevertheless, the decision to go down a few days each month was not an easy one. He recalled the film Mississippi Burning when he thought of Jackson and initially told himself, “I am not going there, where men say ‘Hey, boy!’ White guys with skinny ties, glasses, and shotguns.”                       

When he arrived, he found Jackson both better and worse than he imagined. The area around the clinic was “avant-garde,” he told me, replete with vintage stores and a coffee house. But Jackson as represented by the protesters was also more challenging than Parker had anticipated. A small group of anti-abortion activists were camped out around the clinic at all times during the day. One of them took a picture of him at Lenny’s, a local sub shop, and a passer-by had recently shouted out his full name, including his middle name—an unsubtle reminder that Parker was being watched. Parker said that his girlfriend, while she supports his work, also “fears harm will befall me” from “the threats,” which he refers to only obliquely, as if discussing them more fully would make them more real.

“I don’t want to falsely reassure myself,” Parker said. “Slepian died in the kitchen, Tiller at church,” he continued, referring to two abortion providers, Bernard Slepian and George Tiller, who had been killed by pro-life extremists.

Yet Parker remained more fixated on the future of the clinic’s patients than on his own. “Which women deserve or don’t deserve care?” Parker asked. “I want for other people what I want for myself. These women should have what I have. And that’s dignity and making peace with an uncertain God.”  

Agent Zapata

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Agent Zapata

A reporter unravels the sequence of events that led to the death of a U.S. federal agent in Mexico.

By Mary Cuddehe

The Atavist Magazine, No. 19


Mary Cuddehe is a writer in New York. Her work has appeared in Rolling StoneMonoclePoderThe Los Angeles Review of BooksThe AtlanticThe Nation, and The New Republic, among other publications. She is a graduate of Columbia University’s Graduate School of Journalism.

Editor: Charles Homans

Producers: Olivia Koski, Gray Beltran

Research and Production: Nadia Wilson

Cover and Interior Illustrations: Daniel Hertzberg

Music: Morricone Youth

Fact Checker: Thomas Stackpole

Copy Editor: Sean Cooper



Published in October 2012. Design updated in 2021.

One

Early in the afternoon on February 15, 2011, two U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents drove south on Federal Highway 57, through the foothills of the Sierra Madre Oriental in central Mexico, in an armored Chevrolet Suburban. The day was perfectly clear, and the agents could see for miles.

Jaime Zapata was behind the wheel. Thirty-two years old, reedy and loose limbed, he was known for his wide grin and practical jokes around the ICE offices in Laredo, Texas, where he was based. Victor Avila, riding shotgun, was his near opposite: a serious, even intimidating veteran agent with a wife and two children. The men had similar backgrounds. Both were Mexican-American, were bilingual, and had been raised in Texas border towns, where, it is sometimes said, a kid growing up has two career choices: become a cop or become a criminal.

At dawn that morning, they had set out from Avila’s apartment in Mexico City, winding north through the rambling outskirts of the city toward San Luis Potosí state. At a meeting point along the highway, two agents from the U.S. consulate in Monterrey were waiting for them, and together the four men loaded the SUV with equipment that Zapata and Avila were supposed to bring back to the American embassy. There were about a dozen boxes in all, enough to fill the entire length of the Suburban except the front seats. The men said their good-byes, and Zapata and Avila turned back toward the capital.

Avila had been working in the ICE attaché office in the American embassy for a year and a half. Zapata was new, on temporary assignment, only nine days removed from his post in Loredo. At around one in the afternoon, he called Stacye Joyner, his girlfriend back in Texas, on his cell phone. They were still hours from Mexico City then; he surveyed the road ahead, the yellowed grass and big sky. “What does it look like?” she asked him.

“It looks like Texas,” he told her. “I’ll send you a picture.”

Two

The building that houses ICE’s Laredo headquarters, one of the tallest in the city of 240,000, has all the architectural verve of a regional bank office—a desert-hued box with a few decorative urns and a patch of grass out front. That drab exterior conceals one of the U.S. government’s busiest hubs on the country’s southern border. Not only ICE but also the Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Customs and Border Protection each occupy a floor. ICE alone has about 100 men and women working out of Laredo. By early 2011, the agency—which is the main investigative arm of the Department of Homeland Security—had gotten so big that Laredo was sending agents like Zapata to the U.S. embassy in Mexico City to shore up its investigations.

As Zapata was barreling down Highway 57, his colleagues in Laredo were gathering in a brightly lit conference room for an all-hands meeting. At the front of the room was Jerry Robinette, the special agent in charge of the swath of south Texas from San Antonio to the border. Robinette, a short, bald man with a white moustache, was infamous among his subordinates for extending the standard tenure in Laredo from three to five years. It was an out-of-the-way place with crummy food and little entertainment to speak of, a far cry from their colleagues’ posts in Southern California and Miami. But what Laredo lacked in amenities, it made up for in action. The bridges that connect the city with its Mexican sister, Nuevo Laredo, and Interstate 35, the highway that runs north from Laredo to Texas’s major cities, are crucial infrastructure for the outlaw industries that ICE is charged with combating: human trafficking, drug running, money laundering. 

That afternoon, Robinette and the other managers were outlining their plans for the year. As the gathered agents shifted listlessly in their chairs, Robinette’s BlackBerry pinged. So did the manager’s next to him, and the others on down the line. One by one they glanced at their phones, then filed out of the room. The agents waited uneasily. “It was like, cricket-cricket—what’s going on?” one of them later recalled. When the bosses returned after a few minutes, they were stone-faced.


Minutes earlier, Zapata and Avila had been driving outside Santa María del Río, a small town in southern San Luis Potosí, when two SUVs sped past them down the highway. There were at least eight people inside the vehicles, and as they passed Avila saw that they were holding their guns in plain view. He had a good idea of who they were. Monterrey, 350 miles to the north, was a base of operations for the Zetas, a rogue paramilitary force that had split off from the Gulf drug cartel the year before and had since become the most feared criminal organization in Mexico. The Zetas had set themselves apart from the competition with their uncommon brutality, massacring migrants, detonating car bombs, and hurling grenades into crowds. Lately, they had moved into San Luis Potosí.

The SUVs disappeared down the road. But soon they reappeared on the horizon, still traveling in the same direction but now moving very slowly and occupying both of the southbound lanes, as if one were overtaking the other. The agents’ car got closer. Suddenly, one of the mysterious SUVs dropped back and tucked in behind Zapata. The other swerved in front. Instinctively, Zapata stepped on the gas and rammed the vehicle ahead of theirs, but it was too late. They were trapped.

Forced to a stop on the shoulder of the highway, Zapata put the Suburban in park. The gunmen poured out of their vehicles and fanned around the agents, screaming at them in Spanish to open the doors. The agents were nervous but assumed they were safe: The Suburban, they knew, was a veritable tank, armored by the British defense contractor BAE Systems to withstand automatic gunfire and fragmentation grenades. They hunkered down to wait out the attack. Then one of the assailants tried the handle on the driver-side door. It was hard to say who was more surprised, the men inside or the men outside, when it opened.

Placing the vehicle in park had automatically unlocked the doors. It was a handy feature found in the best new American cars—and one that no one had bothered to disable in the bulletproofed SUV. For a moment everyone froze, then Zapata lunged to close the door. By the time he got it shut, however, the agents realized that, in the commotion, one of them had inadvertently lowered the passenger-side window—just a crack, but enough for the men outside to jam the barrels of what looked to be a 9-millimeter pistol and an assault rifle into the gap. Avila yelled that they worked for the U.S. embassy, that they were Americans, as if the words were a shield.

The SUV erupted with gunfire, and a bullet tore through Avila’s left leg. The noise was deafening, and he singed his hands as he tried to push the gun barrels out of the vehicle. But the assassins must have decided that they couldn’t quite reach him from where they stood. They withdrew, and Avila was finally able to roll up the window. The men fanned out around the SUV once more, firing at least 80 more rounds. The Suburban shook, the back panel began to splinter, but the bulletproofing held. And then, as fast as they approached, the hit men drove away.

Zapata put his foot on the gas, lurching the car forward, but quickly slumped over in the driver’s seat. He had been hit several times at close range, and his femoral artery was severed. Avila pressed his hands over Zapata’s heart. He searched in vain for a place on his body to apply pressure, anywhere he could stanch the bleeding. Almost nothing was left of Zapata’s right side.

“I’m going to die,” Zapata told him.

“No, you’re not,” Avila said. “I’m calling for help. You’re going to be fine.” There was a distress signal hooked up to the Suburban’s GPS, he thought, but it didn’t seem to be working. On a cell phone, he started calling every number he could think of for backup. Finally, someone picked up one of the phones on his desk at the embassy, and the chief of the federal police dispatched a helicopter.

Cars hurtled past on the highway, none of them stopping—no one was about to get involved in a shoot-out. At one point, Avila later said, an ambulance pulled over and a man got out and approached the car, walking through the bullet casings surrounding the Suburban. He said he had come to help, but Avila, terrified that the man was another assailant in disguise, refused to get out of the vehicle. The ambulance drove off, and Avila and Zapata were alone again.

In the conference room back in Laredo, the bosses delivered the news. There had been an ambush in central Mexico, the assembled ICE agents were told, and it appeared that one of their own, Jaime Zapata, had been involved. The room went quiet. Not knowing what else to do, the agents clasped hands and began to pray.

After 40 minutes, Avila was still waiting along the highway. His ears were ringing, his left leg swelling up like a balloon filling with air. The nice young agent he had just met sat beside him, folded over in his seat. Jaime Zapata was dead.

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Illustration: Daniel Hertzberg

Three

A few hours later, Mary Zapata was in her bedroom scratching a lottery ticket when her husband, Amador, burst in. Outside, government-issue SUVs were lining up in the driveway of the small white house with olive trim where the couple lived in Brownsville, Texas.

Later, she would recall what happened next in fragments. There were the agents from her son Jaime’s ICE office in Laredo coming through the doorway; “He’s been injured,” she remembered one of them saying. There were the family members and friends filtering into the living room, the agents writing down names and numbers, talking on their phones, closing off the street outside. And there was the knock on the door to the bathroom, where she had barricaded herself to make a phone call. It was her eldest son. “Jaime’s dead,” he told her.

Over the next week, the Zapatas proceeded numbly through the kind of rituals that follow a public death. President Barack Obama called the house to offer condolences. When Jaime’s body finally arrived at the Brownsville airport, in a coffin draped with an American flag, a long motorcade accompanied it to the funeral home. On the morning of February 22, more than 1,000 mourners crowded into the city’s event center for the funeral Mass. Attorney General Eric Holder, Homeland Security secretary Janet Napolitano, and ICE director John Morton all offered eulogies. Zapata had served “the cause of justice and the rule of law,” Napolitano told the crowd. “We must and will eradicate this scourge that took his life,” Holder said. Together they watched as Victor Avila, his wounds hidden beneath a dark suit, was rolled in a wheelchair to the side of Zapata’s coffin, where he laid a single flower.

The following day, the Mexican army raided four Zeta safe houses in San Luis Potosí and emerged with six men they claimed had taken part in the attack. They were presented that afternoon at a press conference in Mexico City, handcuffed and dressed in the kind of reflective orange vests that highway construction workers wear, led before the cameras by grim-eyed soldiers whose faces were concealed behind balaclavas. In the center of the group was the alleged ringleader, a lantern-jawed San Luis Potosí native named Julian Zapata, known among the Zetas as El Piolín (Tweety Bird). In custody, the authorities said, he had already confessed to participating in the attack on the ICE agent of the same name.

In Mexico, the announcement was something of a disappointment: Rumors had been circulating that the army had arrested a Zeta leader of far greater significance, perhaps Jesus “El Mamito” Rejón, the regional boss and the highest-ranked narcotraficante on the DEA’s most-wanted list, or Miguel “Z-40” Treviño, one of the gang’s two leaders. El Piolín was not much more than a local thug. At the press conference, facing a barrage of camera flashes, he appeared at times to be smirking.

Four

I visited Jaime Zapata’s parents’ home for the first time a little more than a year after their son’s funeral. Mary, a tall and poised woman with a round face and short brown hair, answered the door and invited me into the living room. After a few minutes, Amador, her shy, avuncular husband, shuffled in quietly and sat on the couch beside her. The inside of the house was all white, even the floors. Sun flooded through a skylight overhead, illuminating the rustic Spanish-style furniture.

Their son’s death had been an anomaly. In the past six years, the drug war has claimed at least 60,000 lives in Mexico, including those of plenty of U.S. citizens: a Texas missionary shot in her pickup truck on a Tamaulipas highway, an American consulate employee and her husband gunned down in the street in Ciudad Juárez. Until last year, however, not one of them was a U.S. federal agent. A retired DEA agent told me that, of the 500 Mexican traffickers he had interviewed over the course of his career, not a single one had ever admitted to targeting Americans. “It’s simply not done,” he said. “It’s bad for business.” A high-level cartel informant offered a similar assessment. “In Mexico,” he told me, “the word is, you fuck with an American agent, you’re through.”

Still, it seemed like a straightforward enough case of gangland murder—and I had come to Brownsville to find out why it hadn’t turned out that way at all. Within days of Zapata’s funeral, the circumstances of his death had become the subject of government stonewalling and political controversy, thoroughly webbed over with conspiracy theories and rumors. Zapata’s parents were as confounded as anyone. By the time I arrived at their home, they had become frequent guests on television news programs in the United States and Mexico, plaintively asking that the U.S. government provide them with the still-disputed details of the events that had led to their son’s death.

Sitting on the couch, the Zapatas seemed at once exhausted by and seasoned in the interview process. Mary was the family narrator, and Amador struggled to get in a word. At one point, he leaned back and let out a loud sigh. “This has turned our lives upside down,” he said.

Mary is 62 and Amador is 65; both are retired from jobs in the public sector, Mary as a secretary for child-protective services and Amador as a livestock inspector for the Department of Agriculture. They married in 1972, following a yearlong courtship that began when Amador was in the Army and Mary, at the urging of Amador’s aunt, a family friend, began writing to him while he was stationed in Vietnam. Like many Tejano families, the Zapatas had deep ties in Mexico and crossed the border often. After their first son, Amador III, was born, in 1973, the family moved to the Gulf state of Veracruz, where Amador took a job eradicating screwworm from local cattle. But the Zapatas found that they missed Texas. By August 1977, Mary was pregnant again, and they moved back to Brownsville. The following spring, Jaime Jorge Zapata was born, a beautiful blond boy with velvet eyebrows.

The Zapata children—ultimately five boys in all—grew up roaming the lush lowlands of the Rio Grande delta, learning to hunt and fish and earning Boy Scout badges. The family was tightly knit; Jaime in particular grew close to his mother and in time developed an almost parental concern for his younger brothers. By middle school, he was dark haired and tall, approaching six foot four, a physically imposing but still ungainly teen whose friends called him Dick Arms and Goofy.

After high school, Zapata went to San Antonio State University, where he majored in criminal justice, though he spent most of his time drinking beer and playing PlayStation. Back in Brownsville, he had taken a breezy approach to his studies—his friends remember him as the kid who could drink anybody under the table, who loved taking weekend trips to the nearby spring-break mecca of South Padre Island—and was smart enough to get decent grades without trying too hard. College was different, though, and four years later he returned to Brownsville, degreeless and adrift. “I think it’s time that you settled,” his mother told him. “You’ve already partied enough.” By then his elder brother Amador was working as a special agent with Customs and Border Protection. Jaime took stock of his own life and reenrolled in school, this time at the University of Texas at Brownsville, graduating four years later with a criminal justice degree.

His first job in law enforcement was as a U.S. Border Patrol agent in Yuma, Arizona, prowling the desert for coyotes. Less than a year later, in the fall of 2006, a position with ICE in Laredo came open. In the frontier-security hierarchy, patrolmen are the grunts. Working for ICE was a step up. Zapata had to go to Georgia for six months of training, but he figured it was worth it. He would be an investigator now—using his brains, not his flashlight.

Five

Zapata arrived in Laredo in October 2006. His first assignment was investigating human-trafficking networks. After a year in the Arizona desert, it felt good to be back in south Texas, and the new job offered an appealing mix of competition, adventure, and adrenaline. Zapata was well liked by his colleagues, even if they grumbled about his enthusiasm, which sometimes looked a little too much like brown-nosing. (“He was always volunteering for shit,” one ICE agent recalled.) As a teenager, he had always been the first kid to jump into the cold swimming pool; now he was the first agent to rush through the door on a raid. He became known for his soothing bedside manner—he was the guy to whom frightened targets, particularly women, warmed first. One of Zapata’s coworkers recalled an ICE raid on a house in Laredo used by a criminal ring that bused illegal immigrants across the bridge into Texas using counterfeit immigration papers. When the agents barged through the door, the woman inside was so terrified that she urinated on herself and refused to speak with anyone—until Zapata arrived. “She was like, ‘I don’t want to talk to you. I want to talk to him,’” the agent said. The woman’s statements “sealed everyone up, absolutely sealed the deal on everyone.”

At the time, agents in Laredo were working on the periphery of a war that had yet to be declared. Two months after Zapata arrived in the office, Mexican president Felipe Calderón, limping from a tough election, would send 4,000 soldiers and police to his home state of Michoacán to fight the drug cartels that had taken control of the region—the first major government strike against the country’s narcotraficantes and the official beginning of the conflict that has since consumed whole regions of the country. But in Nuevo Laredo, the city just across the Mexican border from Zapata’s new post, normal life had begun to erode several years earlier. As recently as 2002, it was common for residents on both sides of the border to move freely between the cities, the Americans taking advantage of Nuevo Laredo’s bargain dentists and booming discos. By 2006, however, many residents from the U.S. side hadn’t “gone across” in years; the sister city had become a forbidding and sinister place.

On a map, Laredo and Nuevo Laredo look like a single sprawling metropolis, shaped like a cowboy boot. Nuevo Laredo is the westward-pointing toe, separated from its American sibling by the sluggish brown expanse of the Rio Grande. Nuevo Laredo contains more than half of the cities’ population, packed into a quarter of their total area.

The cities are connected by five bridges, over which some 1.5 million trucks and 5 million cars pass each year, comprising the country’s busiest commercial land crossing—and an important node in the global black market. Customs agents in Laredo inspect vehicles traversing the river but can’t thoroughly check them all. When I visited the city last spring, a retired DEA agent drove me to a long-haul crossing and parked his car. “You see that?” he said, pointing at the line of rigs queued up at the bridge. “There’s definitely a load. There is always a load.”

In one form or another, illicit substances have been smuggled across the border as long as the United States has deemed them illicit. Opium and marijuana cultivation in Mexico dates back a century. During Prohibition, Mexicans set up borderland bars to cater to wayward gringos. Mexico was, in fact, the first of the two countries to ban marijuana, but by the 1970s the U.S. had surpassed its neighbor in passing and enforcing antidrug laws, and the modern trafficking system was born.

In the 1980s, the trade in heroin, marijuana, and cocaine was controlled largely by the Guadalajara cartel and its legendary leader, Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo, known in Mexico as El Padrino, the Godfather. By then the U.S. was closing off the Caribbean routes that smugglers had used to move cocaine from Colombia into south Florida, shifting them overland across Mexico. Colombia’s crackdown on Pablo Escobar and other kingpins helped shape the transition. Opportunities to ferry contraband into the U.S. grew exponentially after 1994, when the North American Free Trade Agreement dramatically increased the flow of goods across the border, and in the wake of Mexico’s 2000 election, when seven decades of rule by the Institutional Revolutionary Party came to a close. As political power was decentralized, drug-trafficking organizations began to flourish like never before.

Today, the majority of the marijuana and methamphetamine produced in Mexico is sold in the U.S., and most of the cocaine from Andean countries like Colombia and Peru moves through Mexico on its way north. The more than $1 trillion the U.S. government has spent on the drug war since the early 1970s has proven no match for the market effects of its citizens’ appetite for narcotics. Estimates of the total value of the industry vary wildly, starting under $10 billion, but they range as high as $40 billion—about what Americans spend on wine each year.

Up until the 1990s, the drug trade at the Laredo crossing was the province of freelancers. Then, as the decade drew to a close, a trafficker named Osiel Cárdenas took the helm of the Gulf cartel, which controlled the regional drug trade from its base in Matamoros. A 32-year-old former mechanic who rose quickly through the Gulf ranks, Cárdenas earned the nickname the Friend Killer after he assassinated his associate and rival Salvador Gómez to secure the leadership of the cartel.

If Cárdenas was ruthless, he was also an innovative businessman. The future of the Gulf cartel, he saw, lay in controlling access to the lucrative I-35 corridor, which runs north from Laredo and would enable his organization to reach major distribution hubs like Dallas and Houston. But Cárdenas was also facing territorial incursions from the west by the Sinaloa cartel, the largest player in the Mexican drug trade. To counter the threat, he built an elite security detail, hiring away deserters from the Mexican army’s special forces. (At least one of the twenty-odd soldiers had likely been trained by the U.S. Army, according to a State Department cable later released by WikiLeaks.) The new enforcers called themselves the Zetas.

Wherever Cárdenas went, his soldier protégés went, too. The Friend Killer felt that a little extra protection was never a bad thing. Not only was he fighting to keep his territory, but he had also been on the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted list since a 1999 confrontation with a pair of federal agents in Matamoros, in which Cárdenas’s gunmen had surrounded the Americans’ car; Cárdenas himself had screamed obscenities at them, waving a gold-plated Kalashnikov. He was arrested and extradited to the United States four years later, following a gun battle with Mexican special forces soldiers. His bust fed into a myth of exceptionalism: U.S. agents, virtually alone among the players in the increasingly chaotic drug war, were off-limits.

After Cárdenas’s arrest, the Zetas—who by then had come to rival the Gulf leadership in power and allegiance—had no boss to guard anymore and dispersed to various towns and cities, extending their influence. “Each one became a leader,” says a high-level informant who worked for the Gulf cartel under Cárdenas. “If they had stayed bodyguards of the new boss of the cartel, this whole wave of violence in the country wouldn’t be happening.” In 2010, the Zetas finally split from the Gulf and quickly wrestled control of Nuevo Laredo away from their old employers.

Today, the Zetas run the city’s downtown from a red adobe building with arched doorways a few blocks from the pedestrian bridge to Texas. No longer content merely to traffic drugs, they have diversified into kidnapping (though they rarely return the kidnapped), extortion, and human trafficking, among other pursuits. Nuevo Laredo shopkeepers wishing to stay in business must pay the Zetas a tax to do so or risk mortal consequences. Zeta lookouts in T-shirts and jeans are ubiquitous, posted opposite the bridge and eyeing everyone who spills off.

The morning I crossed over myself, in May, I was the only gringa in sight. The man I was with, a local dentist I’ll call Luis, was nervous about the attention I might attract, and he grabbed my hand as we stepped off the bridge. In Zeta-occupied Nuevo Laredo, the rhythms of normal life and flashes of barbarism exist alongside each other with jarring incongruity. In one of the town’s central plazas, children were performing a Oaxacan dance. They wore burlap sacks over their heads, with big eyes and lips painted on them, and their parents laughed and snapped pictures as the giant faces spun and hopped around. Then Luis and I turned a corner and passed the husk of a building still smoldering from a fire. “What was that place?” I asked. Luis just shrugged, guiding me to the other side of the street. He estimated that Nuevo Laredo’s population had dropped 70 percent in recent years. I balked at the number. “It’s true,” he said. “Everyone who can leave has left.”

That afternoon, a car bomb exploded in front of a police station, wounding 10, and I learned that someone had set fire to a disco the night before. Curious if it was the building I had walked by, I tried searching for images online but found none. For Mexican journalists, reporting on the drug war has become nearly as hazardous as fighting it, and much of the country’s once dogged local coverage has been replaced by a frightened silence. A few days after my visit, Zane Plemmons, a Texas photojournalist on assignment in Nuevo Laredo for the Mexican newspaper El Debate, disappeared; a receptionist at the hotel where he was staying told his family that armed men wearing masks had cleared his belongings out of his room.

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Six

After a few years, Zapata’s hard work paid off, and he was invited to join ICE’s elite Border Enforcement Security Task Force. The job pulled him deeper into the workings of the vast criminal economy spanning the river. Now he was probing gun-trafficking rings, drug smugglers, and money launderers—virtually anyone and anything that could be considered a threat to American interests. That summer, Zapata’s team intercepted 80 firearms en route from Phoenix, by way of San Antonio, to the Sinaloa cartel. On another occasion, he led ICE agents in a raid on a ranch off a dirt road south of Laredo, where a large stash of cocaine had been hidden in a cement bunker. A photograph from that day shows Zapata, who had jumped into the hole ahead of his colleagues, holding up a bundle of white powder and grinning.

Zapata’s cases could last months; at the height of a probe, it wasn’t unusual for him to pull an 80-hour week. The pressure could be overwhelming, and he tried to keep the mood light around the office. “If you’re stressed out, just do a little picture, man,” he would say. Photoshopping the faces of colleagues onto the bodies of models and movie stars, he taped up the results over their desks. To unwind he bought a boat, which he took out fishing on Laguna Madre Bay whenever he could. He formed a competitive barbecue team with a few guys from the office, inviting a couple of agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives to join and christening the squad Fire and Ice. He maintained his college affinity for video games, playing epic sessions of Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare; they helped him with his work, he swore to Joyner, his girlfriend.

Still, by late 2010 the pace was beginning to wear him out. Sometimes he fantasized about leaving it all behind, retiring to a big ranch and raising a brood as a stay-at-home dad. Then the job in Mexico came up. Zapata was ready for a break. He signed up right away.

As his transfer date approached, Zapata started going for long runs on the looping, windswept roads by his condo and eating salad, eventually shedding 25 pounds. He told Joyner and his parents that he wanted to be strong and fit just in case but assured them that his life wouldn’t be in danger. He would be riding a desk at the embassy: American agents there provided intelligence, training, and equipment but were not supposed to participate in field operations. And although the drug war had ravaged much of the country, Mexico City had remained remarkably untouched. The U.S. embassy sat on Reforma Avenue, a treelined boulevard full of public art and ritzy hotels. Barricades surrounded the perimeter, and visitors had to pass through two levels of security to get in. “I’ll be working out of the embassy,” he told his mother. “I’ll be driving an armored vehicle. My friends have gone and they’ve come back.”

The night before Zapata left, the Pittsburgh Steelers were playing the Green Bay Packers in the Super Bowl, and he and Joyner went to a party at another agent’s house. As usual, he beelined for the kitchen and spent most of the night there. There was nothing he loved more than this. Looking back, friends remembered him as relaxed and cheerful that night, as if the stress of the grind in Laredo were falling away.

The next morning, Joyner drove him to the airport, and they sat down for one last meal together at an airport restaurant. Joyner picked at her eggs. She was less enthusiastic about his assignment than he was. There was the vague sense of danger, but mostly she wasn’t looking forward to their being apart for three months. Finally, Zapata stood up, wrapped his long arms around her one last time, and disappeared through the security gate.

Seven

Zapata spent the next few days meeting new colleagues at the embassy, going shopping, and checking out the bars in the capital city. On Sunday, February 13, he toured Teotihuacan, the ancient holy city of the Aztecs, climbing one of the pyramids and lingering at the top, stretching his arms toward the sky. Back at the hotel the following evening, he called Joyner. He hadn’t had much to do yet, he told her, and he was anxious to get started. But things were picking up—he was going on a mission in the morning.

That afternoon, Ricky Gonzalez, the agent from Laredo whom Zapata was replacing in Mexico City, had said that he wasn’t able to go to San Luis Potosí for a scheduled meeting with agents from the consulate in Monterrey. Zapata, as usual, volunteered. (Although ICE has refused to comment on the nature of Zapata’s assignment, several government sources familiar with the case told me they heard it was “some kind of wiretap”—a possible explanation for the equipment, widely rumored to be surveillance gear, that Zapata and Avila were dispatched to collect. One source believed that the target of the wiretap was the Zetas.) The next day, he and Avila set out early from Mexico City, hoping to beat the morning rush hour.

It was unclear how the agents first caught the attention of the cell that attacked them. Julian Zapata, the Zeta whom the Mexican police eventually apprehended, would later claim the ambush was a mistake. He and his men, he said, mistook Zapata and Avila for rivals in an armored SUV. Although landlocked San Luis Potosí was of little obvious import to the cartels, it had recently become a flashpoint as the struggle between the Gulf cartel and the Zetas had intensified and moved south. From 2009 to 2010, the number of recorded homicides in the state jumped 55 percent to 752.

The Zeta’s answer was a convenient one—better to call the first murder of an American agent in decades an accident. But there were reasons to believe he might have been telling the truth. An organized hit seemed unlikely; Jaime Zapata had newly arrived in Mexico and had volunteered for the mission on short notice. The Suburban had diplomatic plates, but the cartel informant I spoke to laughed off the possibility that the Zetas allegedly involved in the hit—unsophisticated recent recruits—would have known what to make of them. “These guys are hicks who didn’t go to school,” he said. “They’re from the hills, from the countryside. They don’t know what a diplomatic plate is.”

Accidentally or otherwise, the Zetas had kicked a hornet’s nest. Presidents Obama and Calderón both expressed outrage and promised that justice would be done. Mexico put up a $1 million reward for information and quickly began an investigation. Eight days later, they rounded up Julian Zapata and his five alleged accomplices. Zapata was quickly extradited to the United States.

There were officers on the American side who believed the arrest to be one of political expedience. “I don’t even know if he’s the triggerman,” one retired law-enforcement officer familiar with the case said of Julian Zapata. “But hey, we got somebody! Who cares! We can check that box.” At the press conference in Mexico City, local reporters were quick to note that one of the six men paraded before them had bruises on his face and seemed to have trouble walking, though El Piolín himself appeared to be unscathed. But authorities on both sides insisted they had the right men. The story might well have ended there but for one thing: The raids in Mexico had also yielded weapons. And at least two of them had come from Texas.

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Illustration: Daniel Hertzberg

Eight

Hours after Jaime Zapata’s funeral on February 22, agents from every federal law-enforcement agency in the United States began knocking on doors across the country. Earlier dragnets in the drug war had been narrowly targeted, with the aim of rolling up a single cartel’s operations north of the border. Operation Fallen Hero was different. Feds and local police in all 50 states were instructed to pull every warrant they had for anyone with a connection to any cartel—the government was after not just the Zetas but the entire drug-trafficking industry. There was a “schoolyard mentality” to the raids, Carl Pike, the head of the DEA’s special operations division, told CBS News. “A bully comes up and pushes you, and if you don’t push back, you’re a victim. We’re pushing back.”

In the space of a week, 676 arrests were made across the country. In New Jersey, agents seized $1 million in cash. In Houston, authorities hauled in $750,000, 322 pounds of marijuana, and 28 pounds of cocaine. And in the Dallas suburb of Lancaster, ATF agents paid a visit to the home of a man by the name of Otilio Osorio.

A stocky 22-year-old, Otilio was living with his elder brother Ranferi, a former Marine who had been discharged honorably in 2009 after tours in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Africa. Shortly after leaving the service, Ranferi Osorio’s estranged wife later testified, he had gone into the business of buying and selling guns as a means of supporting his family.

From there it was a short path to lucrative dealings with Mexican criminals willing to pay top dollar for American guns. The practice of straw purchasing, in which a U.S. citizen with no criminal background makes the buy, is one of the principal means—if not the principal means—by which gangs like the Zetas arm themselves. No one knows how many guns cross the border illegally, but a 2009 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office found that over 87 percent of the firearms linked to violent crimes in Mexico and traced over the previous five years originated with U.S. dealers. A straw purchaser could be anyone. They are, by definition, the kind of people no one would be watching.

The Dallas office of the ATF first received reports that the Osorio brothers were buying weapons late in the summer of 2010, according to reporting by Hearst Newspapers, but that fact alone wasn’t enough to cause alarm or warrant a special investigation. The Osorio name turned up a second time on September 17, 2010, when a WASR rifle and a Draco pistol that had been seized in La Pryor, Texas, en route to the border, had been traced back to Ranferi. An ATF office in New Mexico had requested the trace, but the results were never sent to Dallas.

Otilio Osorio seemed unalarmed when the ATF showed up on his doorstep on February 24, and he invited the agents inside, according to later court testimony. Guns in various stages of disassembly were lying around the house in plain view. Osorio told the agents that he was a Draco specialist, a man who bought and fixed up weapons. After a brief conversation, the agents left Osorio to his work. Whatever the brothers were up to, it didn’t appear to be enough to justify an arrest.

That same day, the ATF requested trace results on three weapons that had been recovered in San Luis Potosí during Julian Zapata’s arrest. Mexican authorities had matched them to the attack on the Suburban through ballistics testing, but the serial numbers had been effaced, and the weapons were sent to a special ATF lab with the technology to recover the numbers. On February 25, the trace results came in: One of the weapons was a Draco, a Romanian AK-47 pistol that had been sold in October 2010 at a gun show in Fort Worth, Texas. The buyer’s name, according to the gun dealer’s records, was Otilio Osorio.


Three months earlier, on the morning of November 9, 2010, Otilio, Ranferi, and a next-door neighbor named Kelvin Morrison had stuffed a cache of semiautomatic assault rifles into duffel bags and driven to a Walmart off the interstate in Lancaster. It was early enough that the parking lot was nearly empty, save for a red truck—a battered old commercial wrecker, its cab held together with baling wire. The driver who emerged from the cab was a courier who had spent the previous day exchanging phone calls with the Osorios and buyers for the Zetas in Nuevo Laredo.

The brothers pulled up next to the truck and popped the hood on their red Ford Explorer. They connected jumper cables to the truck’s battery to make the exchange look innocuous. As they loaded the bags, the courier told them that the drive to Laredo would take about eight hours. “Let them know what time I left,” he said. “They’re expecting these things down there in a certain amount of time.”

“You be careful,” Ranferi told him. “I’ll see you in the next one.” The three Americans got back in the Explorer and drove away.

Unbeknownst to the dealers, federal agents had been watching the handoff. Once the Explorer had gone, agents from Dallas tailed the Osorio brothers while a team from Laredo followed the truck. Safely out of view of the Osorios, the truck pulled to the side of the road, and the agents jumped in back. The courier was actually an ATF informant, who had been wired with a pen camera throughout the transaction. His ruse yielded 40 weapons in total—each with a bright silver strip where the serial number used to be.

The Dallas team stayed with the Explorer for a couple of hours, waiting until the vehicle made a routine traffic violation to pull it over. Instead of arresting the Osorios and Morrison, however, the ATF agents simply took down their information and let them go. The agency declined to comment for this story, but Thomas Crowley, an ATF spokesman, told reporters in May that the stop was part of another criminal probe. “Taking them down and arresting them at that time,” he said, “would have possibly jeopardized that investigation.” An ATF agent named Hector Tarango would later testify that his office had merely been assisting the DEA that morning. Another DEA source told me that the sting was part of a DEA operation in Laredo; the ATF had agreed not to interfere. “This was not their case,” he said. “This was our case.”

In any event, the ATF agents initially failed to fill out the paperwork for the handoff at the Walmart. After the Draco used to kill Zapata was traced back to the Osorios, however, they finally did. Three days later, authorities returned to the Osorios’ house with an arrest warrant. There they seized rifles, grinders, a vice, and a can of black spray-paint—the makings of a smuggler’s workshop.

Nine

Zapata’s murder, as it happened, was not the only killing of a federal agent that would be tied to a botched gun bust. Two months before his death, a U.S. Border Patrol agent named Brian Terry had been killed in a shootout with gunmen—believed to be Mexican bandits—in Peck Canyon, Arizona, near the Mexican border. The two semiautomatic rifles found at the crime scene were later traced to firearms dealers in Phoenix, and it emerged that the straw buyers who’d purchased them had been under surveillance by the ATF. They were targets of an operation called Fast and Furious—reportedly because the suspects liked to drag-race cars in the desert—and were known to be smuggling weapons across the border.

Several weeks after Terry’s death, a Phoenix ATF agent named John Dodson contacted Senator Chuck Grassley, the ranking Republican on the Senate Judiciary Committee, with an explosive allegation. Dodson claimed that his superiors had deliberately allowed the Fast and Furious guns to “walk” across the border as part of an attempt to map out the smuggling network that armed the Sinaloa cartel. Instead, the weapons had simply gone missing in Mexico, eventually turning up in the hands of Terry’s killers.

The notion that the U.S. might have willingly armed Mexican cartels was obviously alarming, and as Dodson became more outspoken and the Justice Department refused to provide a satisfying explanation, Fast and Furious mushroomed into a full-blown scandal. Conservative media outlets covered it obsessively—and for the Republican lawmakers who had taken the reins of Congress’s investigative committees in January after four years out of power, it offered a golden opportunity to hold the Obama administration’s feet to the fire. Two weeks before Zapata’s murder, Grassley had written to Kenneth Melson, the acting director of the ATF, first demanding information about Fast and Furious, and then, in a follow-up letter, accusing the ATF of “retaliation against whistleblowers.” On February 28, 2011,  Attorney General Eric Holder finally asked Justice Department inspector general Michael Horowitz to investigate Fast and Furious.

It was in this politically charged atmosphere that the Justice Department announced the arrest of the Osorio brothers and Kelvin Morrison on March 1. As in the investigation of Terry’s murder, the central question was whether weapons that could have been intercepted by federal agents had ended up in Mexico rather than an evidence locker in Texas. Otilio Osorio had bought the pistol used to kill Zapata less than a month before handing off a shipment of guns to an emissary for the gang that had killed him. Had the Draco been in the next shipment he sent to Mexico?

The Justice Department’s official announcement of the arrest was vague on this score. It detailed the November sting operation in the Walmart parking lot, and acknowledged that one of the guns used in the assault on the ICE agents’ vehicle had been purchased in October by Otilio Osorio, but carefully avoided drawing any connection between the two. “We saw the press release, and the press release was very curious,” one of Grassley’s committee staffers told me. Three days later, the senator’s office sent the first of another series of letters to Melson—this time about the Zapata case. “How can we know that [the gun Osorio bought] did not make its way down to Mexico after the November investigation,” it read, “when the arrest of these three criminals might have prevented the gun from being trafficked and later used to murder Agent Zapata?”

In May, ICE invited the Zapata family to fly to Washington, D.C., to attend National Police Week, the annual ceremony for the families of fallen law-enforcement officers. At ICE headquarters, John Morton, the director, showed them around. A three-dimensional plaque honoring their son had been installed near the entrance to the building. Further inside was a second Zapata plaque made of crystal, and they stopped to place red roses at its base. On the third floor, they were met by the agency’s top brass, gathered in the newly dedicated Jaime Zapata conference room.

Beneath the formalities, however, was an unspoken tension. Back in Texas, the Zapatas had hired a pair of attorneys, Benigno Martinez and Raymond Thomas, who had traveled with them to Washington. At first the family had simply wanted help closing their son’s estate as they struggled to put their lives back together. Amid “the hype,” as Mary described it, of the funeral, it seemed as if the entire federal government were there to help them. Then the agents left their living room, the SUVs with their tinted windows pulled out of the driveway, and the Zapatas were alone. Mary felt like she was sinking into the ground. She wasn’t really sleeping anymore, only two or three hours a night at most. One night after another she would sit up in bed, turn on her laptop, and type “Jaime Zapata ICE agent” into the search engine.

It was during one of her midnight searches that Mary first came across the Osorio brothers and the details that had gradually emerged about their story. In March 2011, Grassley’s investigators turned up mentions of Ranferi Osorio and Kelvin Morrison in ATF records from September 2010—suggesting that, contrary to the language of the Justice Department press release about their arrest, the agency had reason to suspect the Osorios were trafficking weapons long before the gun that killed Zapata was purchased. On March 3, an editorial appeared in the Dallas Morning News demanding that the ATF “provide a full accounting” of gun walking “that may well have contributed to two American law enforcement deaths.” Mary wanted answers, too. She had seen the coverage of the Fast and Furious saga on TV and wondered, What about my son? Did something like that happen to my son?

Before the Zapatas left for Washington, Martinez and Thomas had set up meetings with Grassley and Representative Darrel Issa, chairman of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Congress’s main investigative panel. “By May,” Thomas told me, “we had questions.” The Zapatas had not been allowed to view the report on their son’s autopsy or even been told the number of times he was shot. They still did not know why he had been sent to San Luis Potosí in the first place. In fact, they knew virtually nothing about the final moments of his life—not officially, anyway. The FBI was investigating the murder but had not shared its findings. With few facts to grab onto amid the swirl of rumor and conjecture, the Zapatas found themselves entertaining even the most absurd speculations. “Did Victor kill him? I just don’t know,” Mary later told me. There was no evidence to suggest he had, but still, “Your mind goes crazy.”

When the family and their attorneys met Issa in his office, the California Republican vowed to find out if there was any connection between Zapata’s death and a gun-walking program like Fast and Furious, and suggested that the attorneys file requests for the government records of the case through the Freedom of Information Act. A few weeks later, Martinez and Thomas mailed a letter to the FBI, the U.S. attorney in south Texas, and three ICE officials. “There are so many different stories regarding what happened that day as well as the different factors that may have contributed to Jaime’s death,” it read. The Zapatas “need your help to find closure.” A few weeks later, the first responses began to arrive. One after another, the requests were denied.

There was, of course, a witness. Victor Avila and his family had also been invited to Washington for National Police Week. The Zapatas had not seen him since he had placed the flower on their son’s coffin in Brownsville, and their attorneys had been trying to contact him without success. “There was no communication,” says Thomas. Though he was with the Zapatas during the tour of the memorials at ICE headquarters, within earshot of all the agency higher-ups there was never a chance for them to talk candidly.

Then, one afternoon in late November, the phone rang at Thomas’s desk in McAllen, Texas. “I nearly fell off my chair,” he told me. The caller was Magdalena Villalobos, a personal-injury lawyer in Fort Worth. She was also Avila’s twin sister, and she wanted to talk.

Ten

From the moment the helicopter whisked him away from the scene of the attack, with Zapata’s body laid out beside him, Avila had been a wreck. At the hospital in San Luis Potosí, surrounded by medical personnel and officers he had never met, he was petrified, certain that at any moment the killers would find him there. He had no idea why they had come for him and Zapata on the highway. But the cartels had eyes and ears in so many government institutions that surely tracking him to the local hospital would be easy.

He had been wary of the mission from the start. Zapata had jumped eagerly at the assignment, but Avila, with his greater depth of experience on the embassy detail, wondered why they were being sent. According to his account of events later related in court filings, Avila confronted his and Zapata’s supervisor in Mexico City, Juan Gelista, with his concerns. The U.S. embassy had a courier service for exactly this kind of work, he pointed out—why couldn’t the equipment simply be flown via diplomatic pouch?

The planned ground route, which crossed the disputed border between Zeta and Gulf cartel territory, struck Avila as too dangerous to be worth the unnecessary risk. Less than a month before, embassy employees had received a memo detailing the hazards posed by the cartels in the area. An advisory from the consulate in Monterrey seven months earlier had warned that the “location and timing of future armed engagements cannot be predicted” throughout northern Mexico and specifically advised against traveling in SUVs, the type of vehicles favored by carjackers. Even San Luis Potosí, six hours to the south, seemed to be getting worse; the day before, authorities there had responded to reports of a firefight on Highway 57 and arrived on the scene to find a still-burning car. An ICE official in Monterrey had warned Avila about an uptick in cartel activity along the exact stretch of highway he and Zapata would be traveling.

According to Avila’s account, Gelista took his concerns seriously enough to break into a meeting between ICE’s attaché in Mexico City and his deputy, Anthony Salisbury, to discuss them. Salisbury seemed irritated at the interruption. “I am not aware of any security issue,” he told Gelista, according to Avila. “This is the first I hear of it.” The mission went ahead as planned.

After the attack, Avila was sent to Houston for medical treatment. From there his family was moved from place to place, never returning to Mexico City. By the fall of 2011, he had begun to recover from his physical injuries, but the trauma of the attack had left him unable to return to work. Finally, he asked Villalobos if she would represent him. “Things began to simmer down a little bit, and he began to digest what happened,” she told me. He thought the mission had been reckless; the memory of it “was eating at him and eating at him.” After Thanksgiving, Villalobos invited Thomas and Martinez to meet her at her office in Fort Worth, and they started planning their strategy.

If anything, the thicket of questions surrounding the incident was growing denser. On January 30, 2012, federal prosecutors in Houston sentenced a man named Manuel Barba, who, like the Osorios, had been caught trafficking guns to the Zetas, including a Century Arms 7.62 semiautomatic rifle that had been in the possession of Zapata’s alleged killers when they were captured in San Luis Potosí. Barba, a pudgy meth dealer, had been running a weapons-smuggling operation out of his mother’s kitchen in Houston; the rifle in question had been bought by an Iraq War veteran named Robert Riendfliesh at a pawn shop in nearby Beaumont and stripped of its serial number by Barba, then shipped along with nine other guns to the Zetas. Like the Osorios, Barba had been a fixture in recent ATF gunrunning probes: Witnesses kept identifying him as a source of weapons. Yet several months had passed before Barba, already awaiting trial on drug-distribution charges, was finally indicted for trafficking firearms. A warrant had been issued for his arrest the day before Zapata’s murder.

Barba’s guilty plea was never publicly announced, and it was weeks before reporters found out about it. Mary Zapata had only learned of it by happenstance, one night while she was awake in bed with her laptop, searching online for information about her son. That the family had not been informed through official channels felt like an affront. The Zapatas’ attorneys requested that the family have the opportunity to testify during sentencing hearings for Barba but were denied on the grounds that the link between the case and Zapata’s death was too distant. This perceived exclusion was the final straw. Not long after, the family agreed that Martinez, Thomas, and Villalobos should begin drafting a lawsuit.

Eleven

On a warm afternoon in April, I drove to Beaumont to visit the pawn shop where one of Barba’s smuggled guns had been bought nearly two years earlier. JJ’s was a windowless box in a seedy strip on the edge of town. The interior was dark, with a line of rifles on the back wall. Behind the register was a man who looked to be in his sixties, wearing a blue JJ’s shirt, a pair of shorts, and white socks pulled up to his calves. It was clear I didn’t belong there, and there wasn’t much point in being coy, so I introduced myself and asked if I could ask him a few questions about the rifle from JJ’s that had been found in the possession of a federal agent’s alleged killers.

The man looked me up and down without moving his head, then put his feet up on the counter. “No, thanks,” he said. Another employee, a dark-eyed giant, placed his hands on a glass case filled with weapons. Noticing some faded Donna Summer and Wham! cassettes by the register, I made an awkward stab at small talk: “Don’t sell a lot of those, huh?” The seconds ticked excruciatingly by. Finally, the man in shorts stood up. He wore an enormous brass belt buckle and, on his left hand, a diamond-encrusted ring. “There’s nothing that beats an intelligent conversation between two knowledgeable people on a subject,” he said. And with that, he showed me the door.

I wasn’t sure what even a less hostile gun dealer in JJ’s position would have said. On the first anniversary of Zapata’s death, a local TV station in Dallas had interviewed Jim Terrell, the dealer who had sold Otilio Osorio the Draco used in the murder. “That breaks my heart,” Terrell—a former law-enforcement officer himself—said. But he was quick to point out that “we always strive to go above and beyond in our screening process” and that he scrupulously documented his gun sales.

Which, in a way, was the point. The longer I looked into the case, the more it seemed like even the most damning of the scenarios that might have led to Zapata’s death—in which the ATF willingly let guns end up in the hands of the Zetas—was overshadowed by the sense that Zapata’s death, or one like it, was simply waiting to happen. The larger failures of the governments on both sides of the border—of the U.S. to curtail the easy access to high-powered weapons, of Mexico to stamp out the corruption that had allowed the cartels to rule much of the country with impunity—were the culprits that no one wanted to blame. The gun dealers surely knew this much: If it hadn’t been their weapons, it would’ve been one of the thousands of others that slip across the border every year. If it hadn’t been Jaime Zapata, it almost certainly would have been someone else.

The following month, I visited the ICE headquarters in Laredo. In the hallway on the second floor, I passed a bronze bust of Zapata, paid for by the Friends of Jaime Zapata, a local charity. It had been unveiled in a ceremony the day before, on what would have been Zapata’s 34th birthday. Mary and Amador Zapata had dutifully attended, even though they had recently appeared on CNN questioning the government’s silence. They looked tired and left quickly after the ceremony. The next day they were returning to Washington for another set of memorials; it was National Police Week again.

Jerry Robinette, the special agent in charge of the office, had given me clearance to talk to a handful of Zapata’s colleagues, though the attack itself would be off-limits. In any case, he told me, there was only “a small circle” who really knew what happened. I was directed to a tiny room with a two-way mirror, where I waited for the 11 people who had signed up to talk to me. A barrel-chested ex-Marine with an anchor tattooed on his biceps walked in and sat down. Javier—like most of the agents—asked me to use his first name only. Between sips from an energy drink, he told me about his time working with Zapata, expounding enthusiastically on Zapata’s prankster reputation and barbecuing skills. But when I asked why he thought Zapata’s family had had to struggle to get answers, he just shrugged.

Another agent walked in, the man who had hosted the Super Bowl party that Zapata had attended the night before he left for Mexico. The two had been very close, Rick said. They had taken trips to the beach; they went fishing together all the time. Rick had even gone to Mexico after Zapata’s death to work at the embassy. But before I could get to the obvious question, he cut me off. “I didn’t learn anything,” he insisted.

That seemed unlikely, and I said so. “You’re a professional investigator,” I said.

“I really don’t know what happened,” he said, getting up to leave.

I was beginning to feel like a visiting therapist, someone the cops were ordered to talk to whether they wanted to or not. The clipped, closely circumscribed answers I was getting were surely, at least in part, a matter of self-interest—the agents’ boss, after all, had instructed them not to tell me much. But there was a genuinely speculative edge to their responses. It occurred to me that Zapata’s own colleagues might not have been part of the small circle, either.

In June, Zapata’s parents’ lawyers held a press conference in Brownsville to announce that they were suing the federal government for $60 million over the wrongful death of their son. Avila had joined them in the suit and filed a separate claim for $12 million. “Jaime was murdered by narco-traffickers,” the claim read. “But the reckless acts and omissions by ICE, ATF and FBI created the opportunity for his death to occur.” A government operation, the lawsuit alleged, was “responsible for allowing … weapons to walk into the hands of known killers.”

In the weeks I spent talking to them, the Zapatas seemed bewildered by what had happened to them, paralyzed by their grief and ill-equipped to navigate the suddenly complex world they inhabited. “I’m just a nobody,” Mary said at one point, telling me that she worried she wasn’t “even educated enough to demand or question or get to the bottom of this.” At the same time, I could see their story becoming more polished, their delivery more poised. They were surrounded by advocates now: the attorneys trying to extract a small fortune from the government, the congressional investigators looking for ammunition for their battles with the Obama administration, even a public relations firm hired by their attorneys to drum up interest in the lawsuit in the media. It was hard to say whether it was getting them any closer to the one thing they cared about. “I don’t know,” Mary told me in September, “if I will ever know what really happened.”

I thought back to the afternoon I had spent with the Zapatas in their sunlight-flooded living room. As they were talking, I began to notice the photographs on the walls. Above the couch was a picture of Jaime, in a suit and tie, standing beside an American flag—the official portrait that had appeared in the stories about his death. Then I noticed a second copy of the same picture, then another and another. I counted seven in all. Mary plucked a photo album from the table and started thumbing through it. “That’s Jaimito. That’s Jaime. This is Jaime in the tractor. That’s Jaime. Jaime and Santa Claus. That’s him. He was very tall, long legs,” she said. She lingered on a photograph of him on his new boat, holding up a big catch and smiling. “There’s a lot of pictures of Jaime and fish.”

She showed me a china cabinet filled with Jaime Zapata commemorative coins and buttons, the cowboy boots he’d had engraved with his initials. Finally, she pointed to a cast-iron plaque above the dining room table that was engraved with Jaime’s name and badge number and a biblical verse, Matthew 5:9: “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called sons of God.” The plaque was so heavy, Mary told me, that it required four men to lift. “It’s beautiful,” she said, gazing up at it. “It’s perfect.”

The Instigators

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The Instigators

Retracing the forces behind the Egyptian revolution.

By David Wolman

The Atavist Magazine, No. 04


Award-winning journalist and author David Wolman is a contributing editor at Wired, a former Fulbright journalism fellow and a winner of the 2011 Oregon Arts Commission individual artists fellowship. He is the author of two works of nonfiction. His third book, The End of Money, will be published in February.

Editor: Evan Ratliff
Designer: Jefferson Rabb
Copy Editor: Sean Cooper
Fact Checker: Kathleen Massara
Illustrators: Ben Gibson and Jason Oldak
Portrait Photographer: Julia Gillard
Infographics: Erik Steiner, Spatial History Project at Stanford University
Translators: Wiam El-Tamami, Mandi Fahmy, and Sharaf Kamal Al-Hourani
Inline Extras, Additional Reporting, and Video Editing: Olivia Koski
Music: Jefferson Rabb
Special thanks: Sysomos, who provided crucial data for the Visual History infographic.


Published in May 2011. Design updated in 2021.

1.

At around 11 o’clock on the chilly morning of February 10, Ahmed Maher was walking toward Tahrir Square in Cairo. Egypt’s revolution had been raging for more than two weeks, and the 31-year-old civil engineer was at the center of it. Maher, a founder of the activist group April 6 Youth, had joined forces with other opposition parties to urge tens of thousands of everyday Egyptians into the streets. They had flooded the square on January 25, been pushed back by police, and then retaken the ground on January 28, demanding an end to the 30-year regime of President Hosni Mubarak. Two weeks later, they were still waiting for it.

Maher’s phone rang. It was a fellow activist. “My friend,” the caller said. “You must come and meet me. You must come and meet me now!”

“OK,” Maher replied calmly. “Where?”

The man told Maher to get in a taxi and head east. As the car wove through downtown and out past dense neighborhoods capped by minarets, Maher received further instructions: The destination was an office of the Ministry of Transportation, near Cairo International Airport. He also learned the alleged purpose of the rendezvous, which he relayed to an acquaintance in a text message:

I’m now going to a meeting with ministers, talking with them about how Mubarak will go. But it’s top secret.

Maher’s caller was a man named Wael Ghonim. A Google executive who had played a key role in mobilizing turnout for the protests, Ghonim had been thrust into the center of the revolution a few days earlier. Detained by police on January 27, blindfolded, and denied communication with the outside world, Ghonim was finally released 12 days later. Hours after he was freed, he had given a heartfelt television interview that inspired thousands more Egyptians to pour into the streets for the first time in their lives.

The revolution seemed reinvigorated. As quiet replaced the state-sponsored violence inflicted on demonstrators at the beginning of the protests, many prominent Egyptians called for the activists to vacate Tahrir Square so the economy could get moving again. Even the international media were eager to nudge the narrative, looking for signs of Cairo’s return to normalcy: traffic jams, ATMs dispensing cash, cargo-laden street vendors. Ghonim’s release, and the outpouring in response to his interview, changed that.

Still, Maher needed to be careful. As long as Mubarak hung on, there was no telling what the regime—or even one cold-blooded member of the secret police—might do. Maher had been a target of the state security apparatus for the past three years, forced underground before and after protests organized by April 6 Youth, or A6Y. He’d been arrested and tortured, as had many of his peers. “I need to be able to move fast,” he told his wife, Reham, explaining his regular absences from family life. “If you want me to be safe, you must leave me alone.” He slept at a rotating collection of locations: inside his beige 1986 Fiat, on a couch his parents kept in storage, on the floor of the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights.

Now he was alone as he stepped out of the taxi and entered the Ministry of Transportation building. Everyone was waiting for him. On one side of the table sat Ghonim, a coordinator with the National Coalition for Change (the political group led by Nobel Peace Prize winner Mohamed ElBaradei), and a friend of Ghonim’s whom Maher didn’t know. On the other side sat three men. He recognized only one: Ahmed Shafik, the former Air Force Commander whom Mubarak had named prime minister on January 29 in an attempt to placate the protestors.

The man beside Shafik extended his hand toward Maher. “Mahmoud Wagdy,” he said flatly. Maher froze, then aborted the handshake. As Cairo’s former head of prisons and criminal investigations, Wagdy had overseen the incarceration of Maher, hundreds of bloggers, opposition political candidates, and activists.

The third person, a burly man dressed in a black suit, didn’t introduce himself but kept his eyes fixed on Maher.

Ghonim’s default bearing is amicably chatty, and this day was no exception. When Maher arrived, Ghonim was already delivering broad-stroke statements about how all citizens must work together to protect Egypt and build a brighter future. Shafik responded with a string of similar sentiments, absent specifics. He mentioned nothing about Mubarak leaving power.

Maher suddenly realized that this was not a meeting to arrange for Mubarak’s departure. A6Y, together with other opposition groups and the protesters in Tahrir Square, had refused to negotiate with the government until Mubarak was gone. Now Maher found himself at the negotiating table. Was it a trap? Even if Wagdy didn’t have henchmen waiting outside for Maher, word that he had met with the government could decimate A6Y’s credibility with protestors—and possibly undercut the revolution itself.

Maher sat silently with his arms crossed, avoiding eye contact with Wagdy. Finally, Shafik addressed him directly.

“Why aren’t you smiling?”

“There is nothing to smile about,” he replied.

Shafik tried to warm him up with small talk, joking about Maher’s shaved head. It was a subject Maher himself often laughed about. During the protests, he wore a ski hat. “My head can be quite shiny,” he had told a friend with a wink. “That doesn’t exactly help when you’re trying to go unnoticed.” But the joke didn’t work here. Maher sat expressionless.

Wagdy also tried to warm him up. “Why are you so quiet? I hear that you are this wild revolutionary!” he said, turning to the man in the black suit. Maher would later learn that this man was the chief scorpion himself: General Hassan Abdel Rahman, director of the State Security Investigative Service, the organization that directed the arbitrary monitoring, detentions, and torture of opposition-group members.

When the meeting concluded, Maher shook hands only with Shafik. “This isn’t what we came here for,” he said to Ghonim before turning for the exit.

Maher jumped in a taxi and headed back downtown. He was frustrated but hopeful. It was clear from the meeting that Shafik was acting independently of Mubarak, a sign that the regime was fracturing. The military, he realized, might already be readying for a formal takeover of the government. This hypothesis gelled with a tip Maher had received just hours prior; a midlevel army official had told him Mubarak was on his way out. That prediction hadn’t come to pass at the meeting, but Maher could tell things were getting close. After the meeting, he sent me this text message:

Mubarak will go now. LOL.

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2.

I first met Maher in 2008, when I traveled to Egypt to see firsthand how the country’s young political activists were using Facebook. At the center of that movement were Maher and A6Y, a then newly established opposition group that was using online organizing to gain members and jump-start small protests. I wrote about their efforts for Wired magazine, but not long afterward a kind of opinion backlash began to form in the West. Pundits declared that the success of April 6 Youth would be fleeting and that technologists had inflated the importance of social media in the world of political activism. A6Y’s brand of activism was mere slacktivism, they chided; changing the world is about more than accumulating “friends” and “fans” online. The idea that the tiny buzzing of A6Y on Facebook could loosen Mubarak’s grip on power seemed preposterous.

Back in the States, I followed the tribulations of April 6 Youth through press releases about the latest arrests of bloggers and protesters. But Maher and his colleagues pressed on, gathering supporters and waiting for the conditions that might spur them, and Egyptians in general, into action.

Then, on January 25, 2011, the revolution began.

Through the weeks of protests, violence, and triumph, I, like many people captivated by the Arab Spring, was glued to my television and computer monitor. But I was also following on my phone, through the occasional bulletins from Maher and others on the scene who were pulling strings imperceptible to the rest of the world.

After Mubarak’s ouster, it would become almost hackneyed to call the revolution a leaderless one. “All of Egypt was as one hand,” people on the streets of Cairo would tell me later. “There was no one, two, three, or five individuals. There was everyone.” One investment banker sounded more like a flower-power peacenik: “It was every class, every religion, every age. It was truly incredible.” There were martyrs, of course: More than 800 people were killed during the uprising, primarily by baltagiya, the regime’s hired thugs, with blows from truncheons, sniper fire, or random shots into crowds. But there weren’t leaders. “No one was a hero because everyone was a hero,” Wael Ghonim tweeted just after the revolution.

The Egyptian revolt lacked a figurehead like a Gandhi or Martin Luther King Jr. The uprising, however, was not nearly as spontaneous as it might have seemed. Resentment against Mubarak had been building for years, even decades, and the country’s well-organized labor movement gained strength, power, and influence as the protests continued. But the revolt was also the culmination of years of plotting and daring and experimentation by activists organizing in the virtual world. Most Egyptians don’t have access to the Internet, and a third of the people in the country can’t even read. Yet the very idea of a leaderless, politically neutral uprising was conceived, nurtured, and brought to fruition by young activists using the new digital tools suddenly at their disposal.

Ahmed Maher was one of the engineers behind the tectonic events in Egypt. In mid-March, I caught a plane back to Cairo to find out what, exactly, he and A6Y had done.

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Ahmed Maher, April 2011 (Photo by Julia Gillard)

3.

Maher grew up in a humble apartment in a rundown area of Maadi, a suburb of Cairo. He is the eldest of three children. His father worked for the state-owned El Nasr Automotive Manufacturing Company, and his mother worked at a nearby school.

Young Ahmed rarely played soccer outside in the streets with other kids. His world was books. On trips to Alexandria to visit his mother’s family, he would spend hours in the print shop run by his grandfather, not far from where the new Library of Alexandria now stands. He loved comic books, science fiction, The Adventures of Tintin, and a popular series for preteens called The Five Adventurers, about a group of adolescent detectives who race around Egypt cracking cases the police can’t solve. Maher’s mother recalls a doctor suggesting that she limit her son’s reading, to give his eyes a respite. At night, Maher would read under the covers with a flashlight.

As a young student, when Maher failed to rank first in a subject, he would attempt to hide his report card from his parents, even though his mother worked at the same school. He was a sensitive boy, she says, and although he is quiet and rarely talks about emotions, he is very much that same person today. “When he speaks passionately about something, you can see his eyes well up with tears,” she says.

The family got their first PC in 1998, when Maher was attending a local university, studying engineering. He had wanted to be a doctor, but when his high school exit exams fell just shy of the scores needed to go into medicine, he turned to engineering. “I was disappointed at first because I didn’t really like math, but I reshaped my mindset,” he said. “If I am going to be an engineer, I thought, then I will learn to like it.” Doctors, he concluded, just read information and act on standard practices. Engineers get to read, organize, and innovate.

By now, Maher had begun frequenting cybercafes, playing online games and visiting chat rooms under the alias Ghosty, a nod to his reputation for quiet. He eventually stumbled on the blogs of outspoken political activists like Wael Abbas and Shahinaz Abdel Salam. But there was no eureka moment. His political awakening was more akin to the mixing of ingredients that, due to their chemical makeup, become volatile. His father was openly critical of Mubarak: The regime had closed the plant where he worked, forcing him to take an early retirement. When Ahmed opened his own engineering business, he quickly saw that his prospects were determined not by the marketplace or talent but by connections (which he lacked) and bribes (which he could not and would not pay). He was also disheartened by simple statistics: A quarter of Egypt’s young people were unemployed, in a poor country managed by one of the world’s most corrupt governments. As he thought about engineering, he realized that bridges, buildings, tunnels, and schools—no matter how well designed—don’t get built without a government that invests on behalf of its citizenry. A civil-liberties attorney in Cairo named Gamal Eid told me that Maher was just “a regular guy who became fed up with corruption and gained the courage to act against it.”

In the fall of 2004, Maher began logging onto Yahoo Groups and other forums to read about the anti-Mubarak group Kefaya, Arabic for “enough.” He started attending weekly demonstrations and was soon volunteering for the secular, liberal El Ghad party, led by Ayman Nour. Nour won about 7 percent of the vote in the 2005 presidential “election,” whereupon Mubarak had him imprisoned on trumped-up charges.

In April of 2006, Maher was arrested during a sit-in supporting a group of judges who were calling for a more independent judiciary. He was imprisoned for two months. “If you’ve never been arrested, the fear of arrest persists,” he later recalled. Once it had finally happened, though, the fear vanished. His mother, however, burst into tears when she learned of her son’s incarceration while watching television, and she urged her husband to convince Ahmed to tone down his activism. Maher’s father listened attentively but did nothing of the sort. Soon, when his mother realized there was no sense in trying to change her son’s mind, both parents quietly lent him whatever support and financial assistance they could.

During his two-month incarceration, Maher sometimes slept 20 hours a day, waking only to eat, use the restroom, and read Mickey Mouse comic books. He says he can fall asleep almost instantly, even if he’s sitting in a chair or curled up sideways on floor tiles in a dilapidated office. The joke among fellow detainees at Cairo’s Torah Prison was that Maher landed himself in jail so that he could catch up on his sleep.

The following winter, Egypt’s national soccer team reached the finals of the continental championships, and a Facebook fan page for the team grew to 45,000 people. Maher and his fellow activist Egyptians suddenly saw the social network’s potential as a tool for mobilization. He was captivated by the idea that a Facebook group is inclusive and egalitarian. It gives participants the power to reach out to all other members at any moment, from anywhere.

But then what? Could a virtual gathering on Facebook influence real-world events? Or would it only lead to talking in circles? Maher decided to find out.

In March of 2008, Maher and a woman named Israa Abdel-Fattah created a Facebook page called April 6 Youth to support an upcoming workers’ strike in the Nile River delta city of El-Mahalla el-Kubra. They sent out emails inviting people to join, urged participants to change their profile pictures to the A6Y logo, and inundated Facebook news feeds with protest-related information. In virtual space, they conjured a new reality: The strike was not a one-time expression of grievance; it was a movement. Within three weeks, the Facebook group had grown to more than 70,000 people. When the day of the strike finally came, the A6Y mobilization helped build turnout in both Mahalla and Cairo. What was destined to be an unnoticed workers’ strike—in a town no one outside Egypt had ever heard of—became an explosive street riot that attracted international media attention and embarrassed the regime.

Soon after, government officials announced that Mubarak was considering blocking Facebook. At the time, damming access to a popular website looked like the typical paranoia of an authoritarian state; none of the activists imagined that a government would (or even could) completely sever Internet access and silence cellular networks. Eventually, the regime backed off its threat.

Buoyed by the success of the strike, Maher and his fellow organizers tried to hold a follow-up rally in May in downtown Cairo. This time the security police were ready. The street where the activists planned to gather was cordoned off, and the tiny trickle of protesters were picked up one by one. Agents of the regime had also taken extra steps to cripple the demonstration in advance. Telecoms were told not to connect calls between anonymous subscribers, essentially eliminating communication between activists who made a habit of switching their SIM cards. The government also temporarily raised wages, hoping to neutralize one of the primary grievances that had fueled the riots in Mahalla. Meanwhile, security officers had been prowling online, joining the Facebook group under fake names and creating bogus pages to slander Maher.

Three days later, Maher was driving to work in his blocky Fiat, which he had nicknamed Zazua. As he neared his office, a crew of police officers ambushed him and surrounded the car. Maher tried to gun the accelerator, sending one of the men jumping back and wincing, but Zazua was pinned between too many vehicles. The officers pulled him out, blindfolded and handcuffed him, and threw him into the back of a van. At the New Cairo police station, one of the officers began punching him, yelling “This is for what you did to my arm, you fucking bastard!” Maher figured he must have been the one he’d hit with the car. Way to go Zazua, he thought.

Maher was then transferred to a state security facility at Lazoghly. The torture lasted about a day and a half. The agents stripped him and covered him with oil—a method for dulling the visible impact of blows—punched and slapped him, dragged him across the floor, and threatened him with electrocution and rape.

When he was released, Maher went to his parents’ apartment. They didn’t know that he had been arrested, and he would have preferred to return to his own apartment to sleep. But his mother had been sick with cancer, and it was her birthday. After climbing the stairs to the eighth-floor apartment, he sat stiffly in the corner on an orange couch, head cocked to the side, wearing a turtleneck sweater to hide the bruises on his neck.

“Are you OK?” his mother asked.

“Yes. I just slept funny.”

4.

Since A6Y had formed in 2008, Egypt’s security police had been monitoring the activists’ Facebook pages, trying to glean intelligence or even sabotage dissidents’ anytime-anywhere assembly. Maher took to calling Facebook the “underground headquarters of the resistance.” The government’s infiltration efforts occasionally created confusion, but in most cases they were laughably transparent. The giveaway was that the saboteurs’ Facebook profiles were nearly blank: few friends, no photos, no wall posts. They had created ciphers, not people. Activists also put plans to a vote within Facebook, which served as a filter on the fake activist’ contributions to the discussion. The ideas voiced by saboteurs would quickly become outliers, forgotten along with other, more pedestrian bad ideas.

Maher and other core members of A6Y’s inner circle called themselves El Matbakh, the Kitchen. They would sometimes take their communications outside the visible Facebook discussion areas and wall postings into cloistered online chat spaces or smaller Facebook groups. Offline, a small inner circle, referred to as “the coordinators,” began meeting monthly at clandestine locations or on the Cairo Metro. In June of 2008, I read a news item about the group and began corresponding with Maher. A few weeks later, I was making plans to meet up with him in Cairo and shadow the group during a protest attempt on the beach in Alexandria.

They chose July 23, the public holiday marking the nation’s 1952 revolution and an end, of sorts, to monarchical rule. Crammed into one of two minivans with the protesters, I watched Maher hurriedly type and send text messages to scouts on the beach who were looking for a location that wasn’t already crawling with police. We eventually unloaded, and the rabble-rousers, many wearing matching A6Y T-shirts, began assembling a kite decorated to look like the Egyptian flag.

But the seaside demonstration was over as quickly as it started. Plainclothes security officers quickly descended on the small gathering and, speaking calmly at first, worked to disperse it. Before long, they were shouting and shoving. One of Maher’s closest confidants, an animated English-speaking banker named Waleed Rashed, turned to me. “Those trucks,” Rashed said, pointing to two army green vehicles speeding past us on the road. “They are coming for us. It is a U-turn there,” he said, pointing to the north. “You must go now.” When I saw the trucks slow to make the looping left turn and head back down to our spot on the beach, I walked away.

That night I learned that some members of the group were later tackled in the street, the police yelling, “Where is Ahmed Maher?” A handful of A6Y members were detained, including Maher’s younger brother, Mostafa. The next day, they grabbed Ahmed as well.

The Mahers’ mother, coincidentally, was already in Alexandria. Her younger sister had recently died; now she learned that her sons had been arrested. (She had not even known they were in Alexandria. No one had. The morning Ahmed left Cairo, he had told his wife he was going to work as usual.)

Maher’s mother went to the police station, wearing all black as if in mourning.

“My sons are here in Alexandria for my sister’s funeral, and you have arrested them!” she shouted at the officer, demanding that they be released.

“Who are your sons, ma’am?”

“Ahmed and Mostafa Maher.”

“Ahmed Maher? He is the leader! The leader of a bunch of criminals! We have all kinds of files on him!”

The officer refused to let her see or contact her sons. She finally managed to find a sympathetic prosecutor, who told her he would do his best to ensure they were treated well. Quietly, he also told her that Ahmed and Mostafa were heroes. “Egypt needs more like them,” he said.

The Maher boys were released within days. Neither had been tortured. I returned to the U.S. to write about the quashed protest. I admired their courage, but the whole thing felt like a prank. At that point, it was hard to imagine Maher and A6Y toppling much of anything.

5.

After the crushed Alexandria protest, Maher and his cohorts regrouped. By the fall of 2008, A6Y was becoming fairly well known in Egypt, at least among the young. Much of that success traced to Maher’s quiet leadership and organizational acumen, combined with the magnetic force of some of A6Y’s more vocal personalities, like Waleed Rashed and a tech-savvy 19-year-old blogger named Mohamed Adel. But it was Maher’s vision that propelled them forward. “He made the bridge from online to offline organizing,” says Sherif Mansour, a senior program officer with Freedom House, a human-rights group in Washington, D.C.

In person, Maher displays a soft-spokenness that can be mistaken for shyness, until you notice how closely he’s concentrating on a conversation. To spend an afternoon, or even a few days, with Maher is to watch him listening. “Everyone says I am so calm, but it’s not that way to me. It’s not calm inside my head,” he told me. “But I make things happen suddenly, so many people are surprised by what I do—that this quiet person did these things.” The Egyptian blogger Wael Abbas told me that Maher “is a velvet fist in a velvet glove. He always avoids clashes with people.” His aura of decency, coupled with his regular-guy street cred, only increased after he was tortured, drawing more young people into A6Y.

Yet while the group’s eagerness for regime change crystallized in online conversations, it was clear to everyone in the Kitchen that they needed to learn more about effective street organizing. So A6Y’s leaders turned again to the Internet, this time for a crash course in the history of nonviolent opposition. The April 6 crew read about the U.S. civil rights movement, studied the writings of Gandhi, and, most critically, connected with the organizers of Serbia’s Otpor student movement.

In 2000, Otpor had helped overthrow the government of Slobodan Miloševic with adroit application of nonviolent protest strategies. The campaign had worked so well that Otpor organizers launched a training program for toppling, or at least upsetting, incumbent governments. It is called Canvas, for Center for Applied NonViolent Action and Strategies. Foreign Policy magazine dubbed it “Revolution U.” In the summer of 2009, A6Y’s Mohamed Adel flew to Belgrade for a Canvas session. Slightly pudgy and disheveled but quick-witted, Adel had been blogging about politics and government corruption since he was 16. “I had to tell people about what I saw in my village,” he told me. In Belgrade, Adel met activists from all over the globe, building relationships with like-minded organizers in Tunisia, Algeria, and elsewhere in the Arab world.

Back in Cairo,  shared what he had learned: Design demonstrations that put the authorities on notice in unexpected ways. Use art and humor, and stay focused on issues that resonate with the masses. Plan events on public holidays. When you do take to the streets, bring water so you don’t pass out; carry a flower to symbolize peace and the lid of a pot or garbage bin to protect against batons; wear comfortable shoes for standing and running, a scarf to shield against tear gas, and leather gloves to protect hands from tear-gas canisters. Wash tear gas from your eyes with soda. Most important of all, don’t treat the police like enemies, because they are not enemies. If any of your fellow protesters look like they might be losing their cool, or if they commit acts of violence, surround and isolate them.

Just as A6Y was establishing itself as a political force and expanding its demonstration tactics, however, the organization faced internal chaos. Maher kept getting fired from jobs: employers would get a visit from state security soon after hiring him and decide that the risks weren’t worth it. At one firm, agents seized Maher’s desktop computer. At home, Maher faced pressure from Reham, who did not like the fact that whenever her husband wasn’t working, he was off at meetings, hiding, or in jail.

That summer a few of the group’s newer members began showing up at A6Y meetings, commandeering the conversation with moronic arguments about how using technologies like Google and Facebook was wrong because they were built by American companies. (Despite the billions of dollars in aid from Washington, Egyptians—like many people in the Arab world—have reactions ranging from skeptical to resentful toward U.S. involvement in their affairs.)

Maher, Adel, and others quickly identified the newcomers as state security plants. “They were just foolish kids,” says Maher. But before the organizers could weed them out, these foolish kids managed to hack into many Kitchen members’ email accounts, which they then made public. They even dug deep enough into Maher’s inbox to find my correspondences. In one tabloid article that Maher remembers, he was accused of collaborating with a Mossad agent identified as David Wolman.

The Kitchen responded with a counter-hack. Adel put together a dummy Facebook page that appeared to contain scandalous information about Maher and A6Y. In fact it was a data trap: To view the information, users had to input their email addresses and passwords. Adel collected their logins and showed them to A6Y’s followers. Maher realized that this kind of online threat was arguably more dangerous than the security forces breaking up street protests or throwing people in jail. Foiled protests could serve to reinforce peoples’ anti-regime convictions, whereas sowing doubt on the Internet about A6Y’s authenticity could undercut support from its base. Much of the battle between state security and activists had moved online.

In the fall of 2009, Maher and his crew began sketching plans for a demonstration against police brutality to take place on January 25, a holiday that honors Egypt’s police. Opposition groups and young activists considered the holiday something of a sick joke, as if Mubarak was making it mandatory that they celebrate state-sponsored torture, intimidation, and graft. But January 25 also offered an optimal occasion for protest: Instead of enjoying a day off, the cops would have to deal with demonstrators. This meant the activists could force the police into what the people at Revolution U called a “dilemma action.” If the regime aggressively thwarted the protest, it would underscore the message of the protesters. If it gave the activists a generous berth, they’d be free to transmit their message.

The activists gathered at a meeting place announced online: the Journalists’ Syndicate. They would do the same a year later, meeting at the General Prosecutor’s building. Both times the result was the same: the January 25 protest fizzled, broken up by police at the gathering point before it could gain momentum. They drew barely a flicker of coverage from domestic and international media. Nevertheless, the A6Y activists decided to make Police Day protests an annual event. Maybe next year, Maher thought, they could attract more people. “You need the perfect conditions,” he had once told me, “a time when people are receptive to being active.”

theatavisti-1423598770-8.jpg

6.

On June 6, 2010, a 28-year-old businessman named Khalid Mohamed Said was seated in a cybercafe in his hometown of Alexandria. According to witness accounts, two local detectives entered the second-floor establishment and began beating him. They slammed his head on a table before the owner told them to take the fighting outside. They pulled Said out to a building entryway where they kicked him and smashed his head against an iron gate until his body went limp.

Official reports of the incident alleged that Said was a drug dealer wanted by police for weapons possession. He died, the authorities claimed, after resisting arrest and trying to swallow a bag of marijuana. But activists were quickly convinced that Said was killed for posting a video showing local police divvying up marijuana they had recently seized. It wasn’t just activists, though. People all over the country, many of whom had no interest in politics, were appalled with official explanations they believed to be lies.

After Said’s family was called to the morgue to identify his body, a photograph of his horrifically mangled face was posted online. The image was too shocking for young Egyptians not to share. Mohammad Al-Anwar, a 22-year-old medical student from the city of Zagazig, later told me that Said’s murder was somehow different from other episodes of torture or murder at the hands of the regime. “Maybe it was because he was a well-known and educated guy with many friends. And the picture. I mean, he was so completely disfigured. I don’t know what it was exactly, but it spread like fire.” A 24-year-old woman I spoke with in Cairo welled up as she recounted what happened to this man she’d never met. “He was this good-looking guy who by all accounts was liked by everyone.” It was painful, another woman told me, to think that Egyptians had let their country devolve into the kind of place where this could happen.

It wasn’t the photo alone that was spreading but also a Facebook page erected in Said’s honor. A number of online memorials were posted, including one created by members of A6Y, but one in particular became a meeting place for tens of thousands, and soon hundreds of thousands, of Egyptians. A month after the murder, the page had 180,000 fans. They convened to vent, connect, pay tribute, and, although they may not have realized it at the time, unite. The page was called We Are All Khalid Said, and the title alone spoke to the sense among Egypt’s educated (but often unemployed) youth that the corrupt state of the State was now everyone’s business.

The person who created We Are All Khalid Said chose to go by the moniker El Shaheed, the Martyr. The page’s content was welcoming and interactive, with emotionally forthright conversations and a seemingly limitless string of thought-provoking comments and links. It encouraged visitors to share news, videos, and photographs about injustices suffered at the hands of Mubarak’s security forces. And its creator took pains to keep the page as casual and unpolitical as possible, using, for example, the Egyptian Arabic of the streets rather than the classical Arabic usually reserved for writing. The posts were drenched in earnestness:

We will triumph because we have no agendas, because we don’t understand politics and negotiations and the dirty games of give-and-take. We will triumph because our tears are heartfelt, because our love is instinctive, because our dreams are legitimate … and because hope has now possessed every one of us. We will triumph because Egypt is above all.

A few weeks after the murder, people organized vigils to honor Said. Dressed in black, they gathered by the corniche in Alexandria, facing the Mediterranean, and on the banks of the Nile in Cairo, to observe an hour-long “silent stand.” Under a Mubarak-era law, any unsanctioned gathering of more than five people could lead to police custody or jail time. By standing at least 10 feet apart and staring out at the sea, the participants were not, technically, assembling.

Just after midnight on July 8, the mysterious man behind We Are All Khalid Said sent an email to Ahmed Maher using the alias Khalid Said. He began by praising the work of the A6Y:

You and Kefaya were the first people in Egypt to wake up and hopefully, God willing, this awakening will continue and we can do something to change this country because we all have the same goal.

He then complained about a newspaper report crediting A6Y with organizing the silent stands. His objection, he said, arose from the fact that he’d worked hard to use We Are All Khalid Said to “attract many non-political people who do not want to feel that I am a political person, or that this community is part of a political organization.” But then he offered the hint of a pledge:

If you would like to, consider me someone who is preparing a generation of young people to join you or anyone else afterwards… I want us to be one hand and to continue each other’s work, so that we don’t get into conflicts and our positive efforts to change Egypt end up turning negative.

 Maher responded immediately, praising “Said” for his mobilization efforts and apologizing for the misinformation in the papers, adding that the error was not the fault of anyone within A6Y. (Egypt’s media, at the time, tended to tie any activities conducted by young people to the A6Y.) But Maher also pointed out that A6Y’s involvement had helped magnify the demonstrations. And because members of the group had been studying up on strategies for nonviolent protest, they were able to help direct the crowds to minimize conflict with the police. Then he added:

This leads us to an important point: maybe we can have a declaration between us, agreeing to consult, collaborate, and coordinate together, so that young people will not be so scattered and afraid anymore during these protests.

Without coordination, Maher explained, people brave enough to head into the streets often have to return home just as fast, having achieved nothing “because one dumb officer shooed them away like flies.”

At 3:13 a.m., “Said” sent a reply. “I can’t begin to describe how happy I was when I read your e-mail,” he wrote. He appreciated that Maher was sensitive to the tone he was striking with the Facebook page. Police brutality, human dignity, freedom—these are universal issues, not political issues. “Said” did not want the agendaless brand of We Are All Khalid Said to be contaminated by an open connection to a political group. Still, Said pointed out,

You have probably noticed how [on the Facebook page] I am gradually moving them away from this fear [of politics] and subtly inserting some political subjects.

The two activists would trade a few more brief emails; Maher then suggested they continue the dialogue via either Gmail or Yahoo chat. “Said” closed out the exchange:

Anyway, I think we can really help each other and benefit from one another. Our goal is one.

I’ll try to be online around midnight.

But I only have Gmail.

While Maher and the pseudonymous organizer continued chatting for months in the online world, offline Maher had found an employer willing to serve as a kind a benefactor. Mamdouh Hamza was a well-known liberal activist in Cairo and the owner of Hamza Associates, a major architecture and engineering firm behind famous projects like the new Library of Alexandria. A friend had told Hamza about Maher’s job troubles. “I hired him without an interview,” Hamza told me later. “I was determined to protect this young man.”

The steady paycheck meant Maher could focus on plotting. On December 30, 2010, “Said” wrote Maher in a chat session, suggesting that they “collaborate on a crazy idea”:

Maher: Oh really? Crazy people are the ones that create change.

Said: January 25th is “Police Day.” We want to celebrate it.

Maher: Cool.

Said: [Showcasing] positive examples and negative examples of police behavior.

Maher: We celebrated it last year.

Said: Really? Send me any links so I can see what you did.

They conferred about what kind of demonstration to conduct, and Maher reiterated the idea that the police were especially “pissed off” to have to work on Police Day. Said wrote back, “I can energize people to participate.” But he needed Maher’s expertise with information dissemination, publicity, and details about how to evade the police. It was soon settled: We Are All Khalid Said would endorse and advertise a January 25 event, while A6Y would coordinate the logistics.

In the first weeks of 2011, emotions in Egypt were smoldering. On January 1, a bombing of a church in Alexandria killed 21 people and injured almost 100 more. Many Egyptians believed the attack was launched by the regime to incite anger between Muslims and Christians. (An investigation is still under way.) Regime change was also fresh in people’s minds because of speculation that Nobel laureate, and local hero, Mohamed ElBaradei might run for office. Next was Tunisia, where protesters had successfully ended the 23-year reign of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.

Ahead of the January 25 event, A6Y set up a control room in an apartment owned by Maher’s boss, Hamza, in an old building downtown. As news of the revolution in Tunisia spread, a public discussion emerged on We Are All Khalid Said about giving a Tunisian-style gift to the Egyptian regime.

By January 14, Egypt’s Twittersphere began to fill with chatter about the uprising. One microblogger wrote, “Dear people watching Arabs Got Talent. There’s a better show going on called Tunisia’s Got Freedom. Watch that.” Two days later, another popular microblogger, 24-year-old Gigi Ibrahim, posted this: “The black and white days are coming, there is no grey.” Others kept directing and redirecting followers, friends, and digital passersby to “a Facebook event page for a revolution in Egypt: http://on.fb.me/hqioSl. Don’t forget to RSVP…” On the 17th, Ibrahim again: “A MAN IN #EGYPT SET HIMSELF ON FIRE CHANTING AGAINST STATE SECURITY IN FRONT OF PARLIAMENT AT 9:00 AM TODAY #Sidbouzid #Revolution attempt?”

That same day, Maher sent “Said” a note after a meeting with other opposition groups:

There have been some suggestions for a protest at the Journalists’ Syndicate, but I’m not convinced. But in today’s meetings to coordinate for January 25, the idea of marches was widely accepted. They will begin in local areas, culminating with a central event in Cairo.

The problem is how to gather when they [state security] can strike any place that we announce. If the organizers started gathering by surprise—and that’s easy enough to do—how do we gather people and continue marching?

There is also a disagreement on the gathering point: Tahrir Square or the Ministry of Interior. Tahrir is easy for the police to lock down, and would be hard to storm if we had less than 5,000 people with us.

Maher detailed how protests in Tahrir over the past few years had been stifled by police who were able to “scatter” people before they could get there.

Two days later, Maher wrote “Said” with another update. “Imagine this,” he wrote. On January 25, various groups of protesters would gather in local areas and then converge on Tahrir. Different opposition groups—ElBaradei supporters, Ayman Nour’s El Ghad party, etc.—would be responsible for the different parts of the city. They would invite people from the neighborhoods to march with them; they would maintain contact with the command center; that would hand out fliers; they would make masks with Said’s face on them; and they would not carry banners associated with political parties—only the Egyptian flag. Their demands: better wages, resignation of the Interior Minister, and an end to the emergency law that gave police free rein to terrorize without consequence. They would also flood Facebook with simple explanations of the protesters’ demands and guides to nonviolent protest tactics—a how-to straight out of the Canvas playbook.

A week before Police Day, a 21-year-old Cairo University student named Alya El Hosseiny was at home, sitting on her bed with her notebook computer, reading about Tunisia’s toppled dictator. She happened upon the Facebook event page for the January 25 demonstrations and decided to post on Twitter about it. “I looked around and couldn’t find an existing hashtag,” she told me later via email, referring to the handles that allow Twitter users to follow every post about a topic. “So I just made up something short and sweet. I thought it was temporary, until I found out everyone was using it”:

#jan25

7.

On the morning of January 25, 2011, Maher was driving around the Cairo neighborhood of Mohandessin. He had been in hiding for days. When he left his apartment a few days prior, Reham asked where he would be heading for the protests. Maher shrugged and said they were still sorting out details.

Maher was wearing a thick pullover sweatshirt with gray patches, a raincoat, a scarf, and a ski hat. Zazua, Maher’s car, has black trim, a thick coating of dust, and a broken triangular window by the driver-side mirror. The car is decorated with two small black fists, the emblem of A6Y and of just about every other solidarity group of the past 100 years: one on the rear windshield, the other on the fuel-tank door. At around 11 a.m., Maher headed toward the square in front of Mostafa Mahmoud Mosque, which sits almost in the middle of one of the area’s widest and busiest thoroughfares, Gameat Al Dowal Al Arabia, or Arab League Street. An array of smaller streets shoot off from it like spokes.

The coalition of anti-Mubarak groups had chosen Mostafa Mahmoud as one of four major landmarks in the city that would serve as initial gathering places. From each, the respective groups would march to Tahrir Square. “It was just like in the movie V for Vendetta,” Maher recalled, referring to the moment in the film when thousands of Londoners march on Parliament.

It was a little after 11:30 when Maher drove past the front of the mosque. Peering out the window of his car, he could see that it was crawling with plainclothes security officers, as well as a lineup of black-clad riot police.

Good, they’re here, he thought, before driving away.

A few days prior, A6Y operatives had announced on Facebook and in newspaper advertisements that a rally would take place outside the mosque after midday prayer, at around 2 p.m., on January 25. Located in a well-to-do neighborhood, Mostafa Mahmoud was exactly the kind of place the police would expect middle-class kids playing around on Facebook to congregate for a demonstration.

The mosque was indeed the protest location, but for the A6Y protestors and the crowds they hoped to rally, it was merely the end point of a larger plan. Shortly after noon, eight groups of about 20 A6Y veterans were dispatched into the back alleys of the shaabi, or working-class neighborhoods, not far from the mosque. From there they would lead, and grow, a series of disparate marches that would converge and arrive en masse at Mostafa Mahmoud. This time it would be impossible for the authorities to pick protesters off individually as they turned out for the main event.

To execute the plan, each unit would linger in the area of Mohandessin until the unit leader received a call with instructions about a precise starting point. The fewer people who knew the exact geography, the less chance state security agents had to intercept or disrupt them. Only Maher and the march coordinator overseeing the eight units knew the starting places. The A6Y team had examined Google Earth images of the city in advance and sketched out routes. Eventually, the narrower streams through the back alleys would meet up and make their way down Arab League Street before arriving at Mustafa Mahmoud.

At 12:30, Maher made three calls. The first was to the operation coordinator, who then dispatched the eight units to their starting points in the shaabi neighborhoods. Then Maher called the protest coordinators in Alexandria and Port Said.

“How’s it going over there? Are you ready? OK. Let’s go.”

As they moved through the narrow alleys, the protestors chanted slogans—“Long Live Egypt! Long Live Egypt!” and “Bread, Freedom, Human Dignity!”—and cheerfully urged people standing in shops and doorways and looking down from balconies to join in.

Just after one o’clock, Maher drove back to the mosque to find hundreds of people gathered. They appeared to be everyday Egyptians from off the streets, responding to the newspaper announcements or word-of-mouth invitations from friends and neighbors. Within an hour, their numbers had swelled to a few thousand. It was fast turning into one of the biggest rallies in Cairo’s recent history, and it hadn’t technically started yet. The scene was electrifying but chaotic. None of the people gathered had been versed in the tactics of nonviolent protest. The crowd was eager to take action, or at least to go somewhere.

Maher jumped up on the railing of a fence and began shouting.

“Just wait! My friends are coming! More people are coming!”

A few people in the crowd recognized him and began repeating the message. To his relief, Rashed, the ebullient spokesman of A6Y, was also there. Maher and Rashed managed to convince everyone to sit down. At one point, Maher guessed that there were as many as 7,000 people surrounding the mosque and spilling out onto Arab League Street. Then he got a call from one of the A6Y leaders guiding the streams of marchers through the shaabi. The eight units had converged and were nearing the overpass that would deliver them to Arab League Street and the mosque.

“Maher!” he heard shouted into his phone. “We have 10,000 people!”

Maher couldn’t believe it. A few minutes later, he got another call from another of the group leaders. Maher covered one ear to block the noise of the crowd.

“We must be 15,000 people! We are nearing the bridge!”

It was 2:20 before the marchers began arriving at the square in front of the mosque. From his perch on the fence, Maher looked out at an almost incomprehensible scene: A ribbon of humanity stretching down Arab League Street as far as he could see.

People began shouting, “Akheeran! Akheeran!” At last! At last! Maher wandered among them, slapping hands and hugging friends. But triumph was usurped by concern: The crowd could splinter at any moment. Maher, Rashed, and other members of A6Y knew that the protest would have the greatest impact if the massive gathering stuck to the plan and headed to the heart of the city, combining forces with the other protest battalions. They locked arms to make a perimeter around the marchers, trying to keep people on course. Periodically, they broke off and sprinted to the front of the pack. Their goal was to keep everyone pointed toward what would soon affectionately become known as the Republic of Tahrir.

8.

By evening there were tens of thousands of people in the square. The police eventually blocked bridges across the Nile, preventing additional protesters from the west from entering Tahrir. But critical mass had already been achieved. By that time, says Rashed, it was “like a war zone.” Members of A6Y and other activists groups that had helped choreograph the march were running through the side streets of downtown, trying to escape the rubber bullets, police batons, and tear gas. On Twitter, there were strobelike reports of pandemonium: “Tear gas!!” “Eyes burning fuck.” “Police is throwing rocks at us.” “Someone badly injured in his leg.”

By nightfall, after protesters had taken up positions in Tahrir for what would become a kind of siege in reverse, Maher and other members of the Kitchen were back in the control room. Their careful planning had paid off. No one had predicted such enormous turnout, but they knew their next steps. January 25 was a Tuesday, and by the next morning they were hurriedly making plans for an even bigger demonstration on Friday, using social media to spread the message but also getting taxi drivers to talk about it, jotting down details on banknotes, and telling anyone who would listen that this giant event was about to take place. They even branded it: the Day of Rage.

Much as they had for the Police Day “celebration,” they advertised the January 28 protest by using event pages on Facebook. Maher and “Said” also put together a document titled “Everything You Need to Know about the Day of Rage.” They wrote it in Google Docs so that once it was up it could be edited by the masses, much like a Wikipedia entry. “Who We Are,” the document begins. “We are Egypt’s young people on the Internet.” It then runs through the basics: why they were protesting, their demands, demonstration places and times, and, perhaps most critical, demonstration instructions emphasizing calm, unity, and level-headedness. “If you’ve never been in a protest before, don’t stand in the front,” the document instructed. “Leave the front lines for those who are more experienced in leading protests and marches so there is no confusion in decision-making.” The guide was appended to the Facebook event page for January 28, which, of course, was administered by We Are All Khalid Said.

By the 28th, the campaign of violence orchestrated by the regime was coming to a head. The young blogger Mohamed Adel was grabbed on the street and beaten up. Maher, meanwhile, was racing around the neighborhood of Imbaba, a poor area in Giza, again trying to keep thousands of marchers on course. Microblogger Mahmoud Salem tweeted that afternoon: “I am ok. I got out. I was ambushed & beaten by the police, my phone confiscated, my car ripped apar& [sic] supplies taken #jan25.”

And then, just before 6 p.m., Egyptians were cut off from the world and from each other. The country’s major Internet service providers were ordered to shut off their networks, rendering websites hosted in-country inaccessible and preventing Egyptians from using email, Facebook, Twitter, and other social-networking services. Mobile-phone networks also went dark, except for anonymous, pro-Mubarak messages sent by the regime.

For many Egyptians, blocking Internet and cellular communications was the last straw. If they had been reluctant to step out into the streets, now they were compelled to—it was the only way to be in contact with one another. For the protest architects, though, the outage meant hurried contingency plans and workarounds. Someone from the Kitchen ventured out to purchase a satellite television for the control room so the group could receive news from beyond. A few locations had also escaped the blackout because of obscure ISPs or international dial-up numbers. Local blogger Sarah Carr found herself with an intact connection, and her apartment quickly filled with friends, and friends of friends, eager to get word out to friends and family.

The Internet blackout was matched by more intimidation, detentions, and beatings. On February 3, after representatives from various opposition groups dispersed following a meeting at Mohamed ElBaradei’s villa, all of the A6Y members who attended the meeting were picked up by police. That same night, security police came the closest they would come to grabbing Maher. Two minibuses pulled onto El Tawfikia Street and stopped in front of building No. 1, which houses the Hisham Mubarak Law Center, one of the bases of operations for opposition organizers outside of Tahrir. Hamza, Maher’s boss, was in the crowd standing across the street when it happened.

Plainclothes officers entered the building and climbed the stairs. They apprehended about 10 people, including the Center’s director, and ushered them downstairs and into the minibuses. According to Hamza, the authorities were also shouting rumors that the people being arrested were from Hamas “and that they have come to burn Cairo. They were kicking [the activists] and hitting them.” A6Y had been using an office just one floor down from the Law Center. Al Jazeera reporter Elizabeth Jones, who had embedded with the A6Y organizers for a documentary, was also briefly detained and then released. Later, her television footage would provide a window into how the group had managed to continue coordinating their part of the revolution from the control room amidst the chaos.   

Maher had just returned from his one respite from the revolution: a small party to celebrate his daughter’s third birthday. As he walked around the corner onto El Tawfikia, he saw soldiers standing post at the entrance to the Law Center and a few people walking out of the building, their hands bound. “Some young people standing downstairs signaled to me to leave quickly, but I didn’t understand. Suddenly, the soldiers noticed me and started running to try and arrest me,” he said. “I ran from them through the side streets. I went home to Tahrir Square to spend the night there because it was the safest place in Egypt.”

9.

Meanwhile, Wael Ghonim was missing. Based in Dubai, Ghonim had arrived in Cairo before January 25 to participate in the protests. He wasn’t just any Egyptian citizen returning home to join his people, however. He was also the mastermind of We Are All Khalid Said. On January 28, he disappeared. The regime may have been after him because he had been openly running the fan page for Mohamed ElBaradei or because the secret police had uncovered his other identity. Ghonim had a contingency plan in place so that if he were detained, one of the few people who knew he was the administrator of the Facebook page would go public with his secret. It was by way of this plan that Maher learned the identity of his co-conspirator. He thought back to a conference about blogging that he and Ghonim had attended in Qatar. During the sessions, Maher had been trading live chat messages with the man he knew only as “Said,” not knowing that he was seated just a few feet away. At one point during a break, Ghonim had casually asked Maher what A6Y had in store for Police Day.

Now Amnesty International, opposition leaders in Egypt, and executives at one of the richest companies in the galaxy were negotiating for Ghonim’s release. When he was finally freed on February 7, he agreed to a television interview on the popular Dream TV program 10 O’clock. When the host asked him to respond to accusations that it was the protesters, not iron-fisted government ministers, who were responsible for the deaths of hundreds of activists throughout Egypt, Ghonim broke down. “I want to say to every mother and father who lost their son: I am so sorry, but it’s not our fault,” he said, fighting back sobs. “I swear to God it is not our fault. It’s the fault of everybody who was holding on to power and refusing to let it go.”

Maher was happy to see his collaborator released but worried about the consequences of a misstep from the newly famous Ghonim. The revolution had been in a precarious lull: By now, Mubarak had made nontrivial concessions, the public was getting tired of revolution-induced economic paralysis, and high-profile people like billionaire businessman Naguib Sawiris were saying that the protesters had underestimated their achievements. “They should declare victory,” Sawiris told The New York Times, and go home.

Ghonim’s release reinvigorated the protesters and the general public alike, but his stardom, not to mention the shock of his time in captivity, made the situation fragile: What if he lost his head? If Ghonim had been coerced or somehow convinced to renounce the protests, or if he even made a comment significantly out of sync with the coalition’s public statements, the movement could be fatally crippled. Maher had to reach him.

Through a professor whom both men knew, Maher conveyed a simple plea to Ghonim, the man who had been his invisible collaborator for months: Stay on message. Mubarak had to go, and the protestors wouldn’t leave Tahrir until he did. Ghonim agreed.

The next day, a Tuesday, Ghonim spoke to the crowds at Tahrir. The media had its new narrative thrust, and demonstrators nationwide were galvanized. Maher, meanwhile, was tapping away on his smartphone and his white notebook computer in the control room. A6Y’s leaders were churning out press releases, taking interviews with journalists, and coordinating with activists in Alexandria, Port Said, Suez, and elsewhere. That day, Maher sent me another text message:

We will organize a great demonstration on Friday in all of Egypt.

They called it the Friday of Departure. That Thursday, Maher got the call from Ghonim to join the secret meeting at the Ministry of Transportation, where he had to face down some of the very men who had hunted him.

The next day, Maher parked Zazua downtown and started walking toward Tahrir. As he passed an electronics shop, he looked in and saw Vice President Omar Suleiman giving a live address. Maher popped into the store just in time to catch the crux of the message: Mubarak was gone.

10.

Saturday, March 19. Maher and Reham walk hand in hand past the elementary school in Maadi where earlier in the day they had cast their ballots. Maher wears a black T-shirt and Reham a pink headscarf. She is eight and a half months pregnant. (Her doctor gave her a due date of April 6.) Today’s referendum is a vote for amending the constitution or scrapping it entirely. The lines extending out of the polling station are long, but the atmosphere is festive. Young people snap photographs with their cell phones, and voters exiting the school building inspect the ink on their fingers. A few people recognize Maher but not many. “More women than men,” he says, a fact that Reham affirms with a teasing nod.

Since the revolution, Maher has been busy. Yesterday he smoked cigars with the Cuban ambassador and tried to sit still for a photographer from The Washington Post. He has also had meetings recently with British Prime Minister David Cameron, the head of the British Parliament, officials from the European Union, and ambassadors from more than half a dozen countries. He had to turn down an invitation to the U.S. embassy because of exhaustion. Recently, when he showed up at the swanky Cairo Marriott for a meeting wearing his typical long-sleeve T-shirt, sneakers, and cargo pants still stained with mud from Tahrir Square, a hotel staffer looked him over and asked what he was doing there. Maher took some satisfaction in saying that he had a meeting with Ahmed Zewail, the revered Egyptian scientist and Nobel laureate. Soon Maher will fly to Spain, where he will speak about his experiences, and, after that, to Qatar, New York, and the salons of Paris. “Do you tweet?” one Western journalist recently asked him. “Do you blog?” “Are you Moses?” (Answers: Yes. Yes. No.) For other members of A6Y, the situation is similar: a whirlwind of travel, queries from publishers, speaking gigs, and discussions with academics and activists from Athens to Boston, all eager to put together a postmortem of events that to most of the world appear to have sprung from nowhere.

The night before the referendum, Maher and a handful of people from the Kitchen gathered at an outdoor café near Cairo’s stock exchange. Maher sat with his briefcase resting on his lap, doing more listening than talking. Someone had a laptop that was passed from person to person every few minutes. Rashed, the boisterous A6Y spokesman, started teasing Maher. A woman had told Rashed that she wanted to marry a man like Maher. Standing up for theatrical effect, Rashed asked, “What do the rest of us have to do? Is it the bald head? Is that the secret?” he said, prompting laughter from the group.

At one point, I asked Rashed if he ever thought they would be here, celebrating the end of the regime. When we had met in 2008, during the brief protest on the beach that day in Alexandria, things hadn’t exactly gone so well.

“That was a great day. The greatest day,” Rashed said.

I asked him what he meant, but he was simultaneously looking at the A6Y Facebook page on the laptop, smoking shisha, and chiming in to two other conversations. So I asked again. How exactly does a demonstration that attracts almost no curious passersby, ends within minutes, and results in beatings and arrests for a handful of participants qualify as a great day?

“Because of this day, we know we are an important group. They came for us right away. Why? Because we are a real problem for them. Thanks to that day, people all over Egypt and outside of Egypt—they know us. They know of this group that is against the government and that we are dangerous to the regime.” That fierce crackdown, said Rashed, provided invaluable advertising and showed the activists that they were powerful. He paused for a moment before repeating his conclusion. “It was a great day.”

Maher agreed. It wasn’t merely that the regime had revealed how worried it was about A6Y and about activities as innocuous as flying a kite-flag. That day in Alexandria, Maher told me, showed that A6Y was “a political force to be reckoned with, just like any party or political organization in Egypt.” Before, he said, A6Y was seen as just a bunch of kids playing around online. What had looked to the outside world like a failed protest was in fact a crystallizing moment that transformed A6Y from small-time protesters into full-fledged insurrectionaries.

A little before midnight, the Kitchen dispersed; there was still a curfew on in Cairo between 12 and 6 a.m. Even today the political situation in Egypt remains unstable. Protests continued well into April, often relating to wages or objections to figures from the old regime who’d retained power or had not been charged with any crimes. A standoff at Cairo University between students and administrators appointed by the former ruling party has yet to be resolved, and on April 9, the military used force to break up a protest in Tahrir, killing two people and injuring dozens. “We have much work to do,” said Maher.

The day after the referendum, Maher’s plan was to go to work and try to be a civil engineer for at least part of the day before leaving for a series of meetings in the evening. After that he had to take Zazua to the mechanic. The car needed a new muffler and replacement glass for the broken window. This was no time to run into car trouble.  The baby was due any day.